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The Need for a Revitalized Common 
Law of the Workplace· 
William R. Corbett' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1960 only two major federal statutory laws regulated 
employment in the United States. The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935.' The NLRA was 
followed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.' For the next 
twenty-five years, no federal labor statutes were enacted. Then, 
for a thirty-year period beginning in 1963, Congress enacted a 
host of employment laws: the Equal Pay Act,• Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA),' the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA),' the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA),' the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (POA),' the 
0 2003 Wiiiiam R. Corbett. All Rl1hui l!Merved. 
' Franlr. I... Man;.1 Proreuor ol IAw, Paul M. Hebert !Aw Ceol6 of 
Louiaiana Silla Unlvertl1'7. Earlier drafta or llU. artlcla wan preoen~ IO ruulty .. 
lhe Univusity or ~rgia School of !Aw, 10 1tudonui In Proroooor Rebocca Hanner 
While'• Low o('tho Worliploa aeminar ot the Unlvcrolty or~rgia School art.aw, and 
to the Federallot Society at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center. I appreciate the valuable 
input I received from faculty and 11tudenta &t eoch or t.hose preaentationa. I al8o t.h3nk 
Michael Sclmi, Rebocco lianner Whito, and David Wo11t for helpful comments on an 
earlier draf\. ort.hi1 article. 
' Pub. L. No. 74- 198, 49 SlAt. 449 (1985) (codilied .. amended at 29 U.S .C. 
H 151·69 (2000)). 
' Pub. L. No. 75-71S, 52 Stat. 1060 (193S) (codified aa amended at 29 U.S.C. 
H 201-19 (2000)). 
• Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codifted u aJMnded at 29 U.S.C. f 
206(d){2000)). 
' Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 StaL 66 (1964) (codilied a1 amended at 42 U.S.C. ff 
2000a to 2000o-15 (2000)). 
' Pub. L. No. 90·202, Sl Stat. 602 (1967) (codified •• amended at 29 U.S.C. 
H 62l-33a (2000)). 
• Pub. L. No. 91-596, S4 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S .C. 
t§ 651·78 (2000)). 
' Pub. L. No. 93-406, S8 Stat. 29 (1974) (codified a• amended at 29 U.S .C. H 
91 
92 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW (Vol. 69: 1 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),' the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act)," the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)," the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991" and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993 (FMLA)." The first three years of the 1990s, with the 
enactment of three major laws, is a particularly notable period 
for the proliferation of employment legislation.~ However, the 
FMLA, the last generally applicable federal employment law, is 
now ten years old. Since 1993, legislation has been proposed 
but stalled in Congress." 
From the dearth of federal employment legislation since 
1993, one might conclude that no significant employment 
issues have arisen or that another means has been found for 
1001-1481(2000)). 
' Pub. L. No. 9&·655, 92 Slot. 2076 (19'18) (codified 88 omondcd al 42 U.S.C. 
f 2000o(k) (2000)). 
' Pub. L. No Ul0-347, 102 SU.I. 6<18 (1938)(codified u •-nded 1129 U.S.C. 
ff 2001-09 (2000)). 
" Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 StoL 890 (1088) (codified a1 1n1ended at 20 U.S .C. 
ti 2101-09 (2000)). 
" Pub. L. No. 101-338, 104 Su.t. 827 0990) (codlfiocl u amended at 42 U.S .C. 
t 12101-12213 (2000)~ 
" Pub. L. No. 102-166, 106 SU.t. 1071 (1891) (codifted 11 42 U.S .C. fl981a 
and other oeottered •ectJons of 42 U.S .C. (2000)). 
" l'ub. L. No. 103-3, 10? Stet. 6 (1998) (eodlfiocl at 29 U.S.C. H 2601-64 
(2000)). 
H One ••Y or 1augin1 th1 ucendancy of an area of \he law ia to oonaidnr law 
school curricula. Sn Thoma• C. Kohlor, Th• o;.1n1t1rotion of Low Lou>: Sot... No"• 
for a Comp<>rative Stud;y of L<gaJ Tron•formation, 73 NarRE DAME L. Rl!v. 1311 ( 1998). 
Until en1ployment. ditcrfmination appeared in lho 1970• in law achool curricula, labor 
Jaw in bolh 1cholanhlp and curricula meant collocllve bargalnlnc and the N1lional 
Wbor Rel11iona Act.. Steven L. WUlbom, lndiulduol Employmrnl RighU and IM 
S14ndard &onomU: O/uc<tion: n_,, and Empirici1m, 61 lfU. L. Rl!v. 101 ( 1988). 
Even after employment ditcrimlnatlon became e1tabli1hed in law school.a, it would be 
the early· t.o mid·l9901 before emp1oyinent law became a coune otTering. Douglu L. 
Leolie, Reltliifl/J th• lnlernalio11a/ Poper Story, 102 YAI..E L.J. 1807, 1906 n .32 (1993) 
(noti:n1 that. law acboola we.re 1t.artlng t.o offer "cmplQYIDe.nt law" cour1e., and 
predlcUni that they would p.ab •1abor law" ln1o the ap<dalty catqory~ Steven 
Howard Kropp, ll<thin••nx tit• Low and Emp/-nt Low Cumculum: Lqal 
EducaJion'• Belated R11pon.ae to the !hmi1e of ColleclifJe Bo.rgainlfl8 and tit• Rln of 
lrldiuidual Rig/lta, 60 U. CIN. L. R~v. 433 (1991) (book review) (reviewing individual 
employment rights cuebookal. 
~ Coc>lider, for ..ample, lho Employment Non·Discriminal.ion AA:t, which 
would amend Title VII of the Civil Righi. Act of 19&4 lo prohibit employmut 
di1Crimina\ion based on Mxua1 orientation. The bill waa reintroduced io the Houae ..ad 
Senate on Jul;y 31, 2001. That bill was fir&t introduced in 1994. ENDA Will ht Rr· 
Introduced in Congrea on July 31, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 30, 2001(No.145), at 
AB. Electronic monitoring bills have been introduced 1iru:e the early 1000., but none 
have been enacted. Stt in{ro no<eo 150-58 and amompanying text. Geoetic 
discrimi.netion bi.111 have been introduced in recent congressional ansions. but they 
have not been enacted. Stt infra notos 171-76 and accompanying text. 
2003) REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE 93 
addressing such issues. Yet, the need to protect employees from 
abuses in the workplace has not significantly dissipated, and in 
some respects may have increased. Disrespect, incivility, 
humiliation of workers," and the invasion of their privacy" are 
not rare in American workplaces. Indeed, science and 
technology have posed at least three significant new threats to 
the dignity and autonomy of workers. First, workers today fear 
the Orwellian nightmare that "Big Brother"" employer will 
invade their privacy by using technology to record their 
conversations, monitor their e-mail communications, and track 
their Internet use." Second, it is possible that employers may 
obtain genetic information about their employees and use it to 
decide whom to hire, fire, promote, or subject to other 
employment actions." Although generally treated as an 
" Seo, ..... Catherine L. Fi1k, Huml/iatron ot WOI'•. S WM. It MAAY J , 
WOMEN It L. 73 (2001); 01vld C. Yamodo, 1'111 l'htnomtnon of •wor•pl- Bui/yins· 
and th• Nttd fbr Stalfl1·Bll11d H°'tih \Vor• &nulro11m1111 Prot«tion, 88 Gl!IO. L.J. 475 
(2000); The Work11t1co Bullying & Trauma lntUtuto Wobtilte (fonnorly the Camvoll!l' 
Againot Workplooo Bullyln1l. 01 ht.tp://www.bullylnjJln1tltuto.org ()o.t violtcd Fob. 13, 
2003); Mnrllyn Elloa, St111/y: RudM•" 11 Po/101111111 U.S. \Vol'kploCB; Dh,..•P«t Car1H1 
Anxum1 &mploy<.,, Low•r Pruductiuity, USA TODAY, Juno 14, 2001, nt 01; PaL l<Jirlnk, 
Rudt, Rud#, Rude: Worltplace lficiuilfly / 1 on the RIM ond Conipat,ftr A.I'll T"•'-nl 
Notice, Clll. DAILY Ht:RALD, Fob. 27, 2001, at I; &ffttt• of Wor•ptoce lncwlllly 
Wid•1Pffl1d, Li .. ly to Llflll'r, R<""'1'Ch Stud:/ Cot1cliid11, DAILY I.All. REP. (BNM, June 
19, 2001 !No. 117), 11114. 
n ~ardin1 the varloua typeo or invA1ion of privacy, - pnerally MAm1sw 
W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (1996 It Cumulative. Supp. 1997 6. Supp. 
2001). In the Mminal article 04 lhe right or privacy, Warren and Br11ndei1 wrot.a that 
in cate1 of lnt.ru1lon lnt.o privacy, the violation 11 ll •bJow LO human di.gnlty, an u11ult 
on human pereonality." 81\muol D. \Van-en & Louil D. Brandeia, TM Right to Privacy, 
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197· 198 (1890~ ... al•a Pnullno 1'. Klm, Prioocy Ri11ht1, P11bllc 
Policy, and Ill• &mploymont Relation•hip, 57 01110 S·r. L..J. 671 (1996). . 
" m:onoE onwew,, 1984 (1949). 
,. Sct, r.g .. Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, 2001 S11ru")': IVorkploce Moni1ori1111 & 
Survcdll.onu: PoJicie1 01'd Practias (Aug. ? , 2001), result.a rrprintft;/ in Emplqywr1 
Watching Comput., U1e for wgnl Liability, AMA Survey Find•, DAILY LAB. RIU'. 
<BNA). Aur. 9, 2001 (No. 153), at A5 (reportinr th•t, of 496 omploye"' 1urveyed, more 
than 60\llo monitor omployea' Internet connectiona, and obout 47~ store aod review 
employ_. e-mail-~ Jay P. Keaan, Cy/J<r·WOl'•lfll or Cybu.Shiriing1 A Finl 
Principia E;mmlnotion of El«tro"ic Prioocy in IM IVOl'Aplace, 54 FIA L. REV. 289 
(2002); Eric P. Robin10n, Bl1 Brother or Alod.ern AIC11to1tment: E-Mail .\lon1lonn1 in 
1/wr Private \Varkploct, 17 LAB. l..\w. 3ll (2001); $. Elizabeth Wilborn, Rtui•itini/ the 
Public/PrivoJe Di.lti11ction: EmplO)•ee Monilori11g in tl1e \Vorltplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 826 
(1998); Chatlos E. Frayer, Note, En1plo:lft Privacy and b1ter11et J.fo11itoring: &lancing 
\Vorkcrs' Righta and Dlsuu,. \Vith Legiliniote Mo11agan1e11t l11tere•tt1. 57 Bus. LAW. 867 
(2002); Amandn Richman, Note, R.eSlorillg th• Bala11«: Empltzytr LU.bility 011d 
Employee Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2001~ Nathan Watson, Note, TM Private 
\Varkpl- and th• Pf'O/J(Md •NOlitt of Elttlroni< Moniwring Act': ls "Nau~· &flOU/!hl, 
54 FED. co ..... L.J. 79 (2001). 
• Su. ,,.., Pauline T. ~ <hn~tic. Diacrimin4li~ <hnelk Privacy: 
Rdbinllirvl &mploytt; Protttlioru for a Bro.ue Nt111 \VOl'Ap/a«, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 1497 
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employment discrimination issue, employers' obtaining and 
using employees' genetic information is more effectively 
conceptualized and addressed as an invasion of privacy issue." 
A third major issue regarding mistreatment of employees in 
the workplace stems, in part, from the fast--paced, around-the-
clock, pressure-packed work environment of the global market. 
Workers are complaining of bullying and harassment by their 
supervisors and co-workers." For many, the abuse they suffer 
in the workplace may affect both their health and quality of 
life, as well as their employer's productivity and ability to 
provide a safe workplace. 
Facing problems of electronic monitoring, genetic 
discrimination, and harassment (not linlited to abuse based on 
protected status>. as well as increasing public attention to 
these issues, Congress might respond, as it bas to past 
workplace problems, with federal legislation. Both members of 
Congress and many employee rights advocates are promoting 
fed eral legislation to address these problems. So far, all such 
proposals have failed at the federal level and only genetic 
discri.mination Jaws have passed at the state level. Still, 
employee rights advocates and scholars in the United States 
favor individual employment rights legislation, particularly at 
the federal level, to address workplace issues.• And why not? 
Title VII and the anti-discrimination principles and theories 
(2002~ Mary Z. Ma kdl1i, 0.n<lic Privacy: N<10 lntru1/<H1 o N•w TOrl, 34 CRJUGH'T'ON L. 
R&v. 965 12oon Oltndora Hugh .. , O.neticoll:y Incorrect, 86 Mo. B.J. 34 (Jan.JFeb. 
2002); Paul Steven Miller, /1 There A Pitik Slip in My O.n.,r Cl<metic Diocriminatioo In 
th< \Vorkplace, 3 J. HEALTH CAREL. & PoL. 225 (2000); Oovld J. Wuldtoch, New Yor4'1 
Lqal Rtstriction1 011 Ott E'uployer'• Cotlectio11 ond U11« of fJtt Empl,oyec,1 Genetic 
lnformatio11, 9 Al.II. l...J. SCI. & 'l'ECH. 39 Cl998); J ared A. Feldm•n & Richard J . Kats, 
Not.e, Genetic Ttt.1tin1 & Dltcrimination in Employme11t: Rttoo'n,,1ending a Uniform 
Swtutory Approach, 19 HOF!ITRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2002). In lhe inlt.ial lawouit of 
it.I kind, the EEOC auod Burlington Northml Sant.I Fe Railway Co. for genetic te1tinJ 
of employeeo, aUesina a violation of the Americana with Dlaabiliti .. Art.. On May 6, 
2002. the case .. utod for $2.2 million. &. EEOC'• Pint O.nttic Tuting Cholk...,. 
Sfltl«l for #2 Million, Partin Announco, DAILY LA& R&P. (BNA), May 9, 2002 (No. 
90), at Al ()lereinaller EEOC'• Pini C.Mlic T<11in1 Cho//1nge). 
11 Stt infra not.el 177-80 and accompanyin1t.ut;1nol«> Kim.1upra note 20. 
n See, 1ource1cited1upro note 16. 
u Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt., Meeting the lkrnond• of Worhtr• into thl' 
Twonty·First Century: Tile PuJ1m1 of Labor and Employn,.nt Law, 68 lND. L.J . 685, 698 
(1993) (noting the current. prorerence ror legiAlat.ive regulation); Rosa Ehrenrcich, 
Dignity ond ~riminotion: Toward ti Plurali1tic Und1r1tcutdi.ng of Workpla" 
Hanu•m•nt, SS Goo. L. J . l, 32 o.128 (1999) ("ln part, tho preference for Title Vil 
!rather than torta to addrtea har .. oment claims) may reOoct a llCholarly bias in favor of 
federal law."); cf. J . Wii.on Parker, AJ.WUJ Employm•nt and th< Cammon Law: A 
Modal ~l to De·Mo'Tinaliu Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. Rav. 347, 370 (1996) 
Oabeling "1'0Dgful diocha'I" lqi1lation "the deus u machloa of employment law"). 
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that emanate from it are the greatest triumph of employment 
Jaw in the United States." 
The failure to enact federal legislative responses to 
emerging workplace issues does not necessarily signal the 
demise of employment law in the United States. What it may 
signal is the end of an era, spanning about thirty years, when 
federal legislation was the legal method of choice to address 
emerging workplace problems. We have reached a point in the 
development of American employment law at which the 
regulatory panacea for the latter half of the twentieth century 
has become very difficult to implement. That situation is likely 
to be exacerbated in the years ahead. The era of federal 
employment legislation as the predominant type of 
employment law may be over - at least for a while.• 
Regardless of whether an epoch in employment law 
history has passed, at this point in time individual employment 
rights legislation is not an appropriate response to these 
emerging workplace problems." This is so for three reasons 
that apply, to varying degrees, to each of the three issues -
electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination, and general 
harassment. Tho first is "6t." Jt is difficult to draft legislation 
that elTectivoly addresses these problems - in other words, that 
fits the problems. They require analytical fle.x:ibility that 
cannot be readily built into a statute. Such flexibility is 
necessary both because of the variety of factual situations, and 
the lack of consensus on the societal balancing of the conflicting 
interests of employers and employees. On the issue of 
electronic monitoring in particular, employers' interests are 
numerous and credible; consequently, it is not clear how and 
" & t Clydo W. Summen, Emp/oynwnt at \Viii in th• Unilod Stot•a: TIMI 
Dfoin• Rilhl of Employen, 8 U. PA. J . LA& A EMP. I.. 66, 66 (2000) (id•ntifyini the 
employment antl~t.crimin1lion lawa as •[tlhe on• ronn or relativitly effective Jepl 
protection ofworlr.o"'"); -oho Cynthia I.. &tlund, W..-• i"6 T-/tQ: ~ Worlrploor, 
Civil Soddy, and tho Low, 89 Gt!O. l...J. I, 61 (2000) (callin1 equal protection and anti· 
diJcrimination law "(o)no or the epic legal developmenta or the twentieth century"~ cf. 
Kim, aupra note 20, at. 1524 (discussing the early IUOOl:?MM of Title Vil ita batt.1in1 
employment diacrin1inat.lon in the decade after it.a paasare, but questioning its current 
efficacy). 
n I nm not. predicting that no more redornl employment legislation will be 
enacted in the foreseeable rut.ure, and I certainly um not urging that result. For 1ome 
workplace i.Mues, such as dlscriminaHon againat bomo1exuals, amending Title Vll ta 
an obvious reeponM and a natural exteruion ot the ext.ent employment discrimination 
lawa. I am e.rgu.ina, however, th.at over~ependeoce on flderal legislation mu.st end. 
• l l may MYer be, but as 1 will dilcuu below, it is premature to reach that 
condusiorL 
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under what circumstances U.S. society should prohibit 
electronic monitoring by employers. Nor is it clear for what 
types of harassing or bullying conduct, and by what persons, 
society should hold employers liable. Further development of 
the law is needed on a case-by-case basis. At some point, 
sufficient consensus in the case law may develop, allowing 
federal or state legislatures to incorporate the standards into a 
statute. However, it is also pcssible that some or all of these 
issues require the flexibility of common law analysis, as the 
cases may be so fact-driven that statutes will never be an 
effective method for addressing them. Thus, fit may never be 
achieved for one or more of these employment issues. 
Second, tho timing is wrong for legislative respcnses to 
these problems. Legislation and common law are often 
interdependent and dynamic: As one develops to address an 
issue inadequately mot by the other, it somet.imes provokes 
change in the other. For example, in tho 1970s and 1980s, 
common law tort theories proved no answer to the pervasive 
problem of sexual harassment. Consequontly, the theory of 
sexual harassment was developed under Title VII." Thereafter, 
the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress became a reliable alternative theory of recovery for 
victims of sexual harassment." Thus, the federal legislation 
prompted an evolut.ion in the common law. Conversely, the 
common Jaw theories of wrongful discharge and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing led to the passage of the 
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act" and other 
state statutory responses to wrongful discharge ... Because of 
the fit problems discussed above, it is time for common law to 
take the lead and provide responses to the emerging workplace 
problems of electronlc monitoring, genetic discrimination and 
bullying. Legislation may follow later. 
Third, despite the success of past employment 
legislation, resorting to this method of regulation too often can 
generate significant backlash. Statutory employment laws have 
problems and weaknesses," and no shortage of opponents who 
11 See, e.g., John J. Donohue ID, Aduocacy Ver1u1 Analy•i.tt in Assesaing 
Employment Dis<rimlnati<N1 Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1610·11 (1992). 
• s .. Mark P. Oerg•n. A Grudging Defen&e of th• Roi• of tile CoUourol Torti 
in Wrongful Tmnincuion Liti11atlon, 74 TEx. L. Rsv. 1693, l 70iMO (l996). 
• MONT. CODB ANN. fl 39·2·901 to 914 (2002). 
" Stt infra notu 260-69 and accompanying texl. 
•• Stt, ~., Kim, 1upra note 20~ at 1525-32. 
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trumpet those problems. Moreover, legislation provides a far 
more concrete target for opponents than evolving common law. 
The attack can be launched against the specific legislation or 
the general proliferation of statutes regulating the workplace. 
Although it may sound unusual to employee rights advocates in 
the hire-and-fire legal regime of the United States,• there are 
many who criticize the considerable expansion of employment 
legislation in the last forty years.• Regardless of one's view 
about the need for more employment protections in the United 
States, it is undeniable that there was a rapid proliferation of 
statutory employment law from 1968 to 1998." Overlap and 
conflict among employment laws creates problems" and lends 
credibility to the view that we have experienced employment 
law sprawl in this nation. For example, some argue that 
genetic discrimination laws duplicate protection provided by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act .• In short, employment law 
bas enough enemies. Its friends need to make careful and 
deliberate choices about the methods of regulation for the 
future so that they do not play into tho hands of its opponents. 
Now is not the appropriate time and these are not the 
appropriate issues for enacting new employment legislation. 
Emerging workplace issues afford the opportunity to 
co.rrect an over-dependence on legislation to regulate 
• 'n>omu C. Kobler, TM Bmplgy,,,.nt 11</otion and lu Orrkrl111 at C.ntury'• 
Bnd: 11<{1tcti"'1• on Bmtrrl"6 Trtnth In Ill• Un/ltd Su>tu, 41 B.C .. L. RltV. 103, 103--04 
(1999) c•AJI lo 1•norally well known, the Unl!A>d Sc.atet hiatorically hu provldod 
compent.ively meacer formal lepl prot.ect.iona of the employment r-elat.ion1.hip. Forelp 
ob1e.rvara t.yplcn.lly charnct.erize us as a 1hirc and flro' 8oclety .. .... ). 
N Chlof among lhc critics are libertaril\n 1.uld law-and-econom.ic1 1cholar1 
such BB Richard Ep11Alln. Su, e.IJ., RICllAllO A . EPSTEIN, PORBIDDEN GROUN06: THE 
CA.sE AOAINST EMPWYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A. Ep11Alln, In 
v.r.,... of the Contract al \ViU, 61 u. CHI. L. RltV. 9<17 (1984); ... • 1 .. WALTIR OLSON, 
THE EXCUSI FACTORY: Row EMPWYMEllT LAW IS PARALYWIG THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACI (19117), 
.. Kohler, ••pm nol6 32, al 104 c·Dupite OW" miown for relaLl•tly 
ahotemioua public inUrvention in worltpla"' relationohipo and our general pref.,.,_ 
for privatAI orderinc, I.he previouo ten to filU>en yearo has been a period ot unuoual 
leplative and judicial activity."). 
" Clyde W. Summe111, Lobor Low °' th• Ctnlury Turn.: A C"4"6in1 of the 
Gutud, 67 NED. L. RICV. 7, 18-19 (1988) (predicting that reconciling overlapping 
protections would be the most difficult problem In employment law and atatlnr thnt 
"'{oJne can acarcoly Imagine an arrangement better deeigned to hold out promi1ee to the 
employee, baraea and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog the lctal 
machinery."). 
" S.n. K.nnedy lo Add,.... Oewic Bia1 Bill'1 Ouu/ap of ADA. Priuoey 
ll<plali"'11, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 26, 2001 (No. 143), at Al; Overlap m C.ntlic 
Bia1 L<gillati<>n 11 Examined in Houa Htorifll on Bill, DAILY LA.II. REP. <BNA~ J11ly 
12. 2001 <No. 133~ al AB. 
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employment. The stated concerns demonstrate not just that 
legislation would be a poor response now, but also suggest what 
is needed: a revitalized common law of the workplace. It is odd 
that the common law applicable to one of the most significant 
aspects of most people's lives" has fallen into relative 
desuetude and is no longer viewed as a viable approach to 
addressing workplace problems. 
In contrast, during the 1970s and 1980s, state courts 
explored innovations in tort and contract Jaw to address 
dissatisfactions with perceived abusive discharges under the 
employment-at-will doctrine.• Unlike those common law 
responses, courts today will not need to create new common 
law theories; the tort theories of invasion of privacy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress can be tweaked to do 
the job. Notably, however, as with the common law 
developments of the earlier period, courts will have to overcome 
their concerns that adjusting the tort theories to accommodate 
the workplace will impinge too much on employers' power and 
prerogative. 
It is true that common law development is slow and 
incremental compared with the passage of legislation." 
Furthermore, it does not have the panache or newsworthiness 
of legislation. But the common law does have some advantages. 
Its flexibility can accommodate a variety of situations that are 
difficult to address through legislation. It permits standards to 
evolve as society, in a panorama of cases, considers the 
" America.DI work more houn th.an any other people ln lhe world and de.ftne 
them1elve1 largely by their work.. U.S. Wor4111 Prit in Lo111er Houn But w,,.. 
0111plM'fd in Producifon, Sny1 Study, DAILY LA.ft. REP. (BNA), Aus. 31, 2001 (No. 169), 
at AS (quoting the economiat who led tJle 1urvey for the lnt.em&tlonal Labour 
Organlution: .. American workers have ll tendency to define ouraalvea by what we do 
for a living. Americen workf.t'I keep worldnc longer and loneer and Ion pr houra. ·r. 
Vicki Sch\lltz, u,.·, IVora, 100 COWY. L. REY. 1881, 1886-91 (2000); Katherine V.W. 
StolMI, rn.. NtUJ h,cho/<Jlico/ Contro<t: lmplkution• of ti.. Cho111i111 Woriplon For 
Labor cmd Emp/.oy~nt Law, 48 UCLA L. RIV. 619 (2001) (diacuuing how work hu 
eclipaed othor primary ract.ora in defining 1ociaJ identity); Kohler, 1upra note 32, at 108 
<"IOJno'• life u.k .. on publicly intelligible moaning largely through participation In 
market labor. The job not only constitutes one'a chief claim to wealth, but is also the 
prime determinant of one'• atatua.")~ Wilbom, tu.pm note 19, at W (noting that people 
obn define lhemBelv .. by 0CQ1patio1U1% r(. Eltlund, •upro note 24, at S ("fflhe 
wcrkp1- it the single moot important 1ilAI or -rative inl<!ndlon and sociability 
amonc adultcitilens ouuide the family."). 
• Stt infra not• 235-39 t.nd accompanying text. 
" Cf. Anit3 Bernsl.ein, How to Moho a Ntw Tort: Thrtt Paradt»:u, 75 TEx. L. 
II.Ev. 1639. 1547 & 1565 (1997) ("The mea1urod, respectful movement of a new tort will 
alwoy1 appear feeble to activi111 •• .. "). 
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problems presented and works them out individually. Finally, 
common law development does not provide a hard target for 
opponents of employment law. By the time the target solidifies, 
opponents may be willing to support employment statutes, 
which then may be viewed as preferable to the common law. 
Part II of this Article discusses the emerging workplace 
issues of electronic invasion of privacy, genetic discrimination, 
and bullying. It considers both the inadequacies of existing law 
and proposals for change. Part Ill discusses the current collage 
that is the employment law of the United States. It traces the 
law's development and considers how various methods of 
regulation have been used at various times. Part IV expresses 
some specific reservations about using legislation to address 
these emerging workplace problems. Finally, Part V discusses 
changes that courts must make in tort theories so that they can 
adequately address these particular issues. 
II. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INVADERS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATORS, 
AND BULLIES: THE QUEST FOR LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
Invasions of privacy, genetic discrimination, and general 
harassment are all manifestations of disrespect and incivility 
in the workplace. Many believe that rampant disrespect in the 
workplace inilicts deleterious consequences on both employees 
and employers." Workplace abuse causes employees 
considerable distress." Likewise, electronic monitoring of 
employees seriously affects both their mental and physical 
health." Additionally, humiliation imposes substantial costs on 
employers in terms of lost work time, decreased productivity, 
• Se.e, e.g., Kesan, tupra note 19, at. 320; Yamada, 1upra note 16, at 483-84. 
41 See-, e.g., Attitudes in the Workplace VIJ: The Se~nth Annual Labor Day 
Survey (Harris Interactive 2001) (reporting that more t.han 35% of workers surveyed 
said that their jobs are banning their physical or mental health, and 42% said job 
pres&ul'e& were interfering with their personal relationships): Survey Shows Growing 
Job Malaise Despite Boom Times in U.S. Labor Market, DAILY LAB. REP. CBNA), Oct. 
17, 2000 (Na. 201), at A7. But see Re•iew of Survey Data Firuf• Little Change in Job 
Satisfaction Levels OllOF HaJf Cent"ry, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 28, 2001 (No. 166), 
at A5 (reporting findings of American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Researth 
based on survey that most Americans aro satisfied with their jobs, and the level of 
$atisfaction has remained relatively oonstant for more than fifty yea.rs). 
Legal oommentators and others have written on the harm that \vorkplaoe humiliation 
causes employees. See sources cited supra note 16. 
0 Wilborn, aupra note 19, at.838 nn.47-48 (citing studies). 
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poor morale and loss of employees." Even the "epidemic" of 
workplace violence" relates to workplace incivility." 
Privacy invaders and bullies are the current hobgoblins 
in the employment world. That is not to say that 
discriminators, the workplace demons of the last century, have 
been exorcized. However, a significant segment of society 
believes that forty years of powerful legal intervention has 
abated virulent workplace discrimination against African 
Americans, women, and others. Now, some attention has 
shifted to status-neutral (color-blind, sex-blind, etc.) initiatives 
to make the workplace more civil for all workers, a place where 
the relatively powerful do not bully, invade the privacy of, and 
otherwise inflict dignitary harms on the relatively powerless." 
Concurrently, attention has shifted away from regulating 
abusive discharges to regulating the terms and conditions 
during employment." 
A. Privacy Invasion: Electronic Invaders and Genetic 
Discriminators 
1. Definitions and Examples 
Invasion of privacy may be the dominant employment 
issue of our time." Although often discussed, privacy is a bard 
concept to define." It has been described as "a value asserted by 
individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive 
society .... Privacy has to do with an individual's autonomy and 
0 See, e.g., Yamsdfl.,8Upra note 16, at483-84. 
0 JLO Cites lVorldwide Epidemic, Urges Global Rtsponse to Violence at Work. 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 20, 1998, at A5. 
~11 Sa Yamada. 1upra note 16, at 483. A legislntive panel in Ma1:1sachus.etts 
studying workplace violence, the Mauachusetts Joint Commit.tee on Public Safety, 
recommended that employers adopt .. zero toleranoo policies" on workplace violence, 
threats, harassme.nt, and bullying. See Afcu&oc.huselt& Panel Seek1 Zero Tol.erantt, 
Humane Police• to Recfuce V'iolencc at Wark, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 25, 2001 (No. 
142), at A3. There are two relationships between workplace violence and workplaca 
incivility: fir&t.. workplace violence may be the most severe form of incivility; and 
second, workplace violence may be pe.rpetrated by victims of workplo.ce ho.rasament 
and bullying. 
" &e infra Part IJ.B.3. 
" &e infra Part JJl.C. 
41 See> e.g., Ke&an, supra note 19, at 292 . 
.. Wilborn, tupra note 19, at 832; Kesan, 1upra note 19, st 306; Kim, supra. 
not.e 17, at 68.'l-87; Makdisi,supro not.e 20, at 979-80. 
'° Robe.rt C. Post, TM Social Founda.t-iont of Privacy: Com.m.unity and Self in 
the Common L<>w Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989). 
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interest in guarding a realm of intimacy around her inner 
penon or hc_r identity." There may be no more succinct and 
pragmatically useful definitions than "t.he right to one'• 
person .. and lhe "right to be let alone."" Both electronic 
monitoring and genetic testing and discrimination" threaten 
employec_s' autonomy regarding personal information. 
Notwithstanding definitional problem11, most Americans 
would agree that privacy is a fundamental and cherished 
right.• Still, Americans recognize, at least in some cont.exta, 
that their privacy rights arc not absolute. Those rights must bo 
balanced against competing societal intereate, and in some 
cases t.he balance will be struck in favor of invruiloos of varying 
typea and degreee. This recognition was no more evident than 
in the af\.ermath of the tragedies of September 11, 2001, when 
Americana quickly acknowledged, although regretfully, that to 
11ome extent privacy righte must yield to 1ecurity in terests.• 
Similarly, the common low tort of invasion of privacy 
recognizes both that privacy must be balanced with other 
important policies,• and that privacy is alienable."' ProfC11SOr 
Robert Post hoa oloquontly described tho delicacy of the 
American right to privacy: "That fragility lof privacy norms in 
modern life) stoma not merely from our ravenous appetite for 
the management of our social environment, but from the 
undeniable prerogatives of public accountability. -
Employcn Invade workplace privacy in many waya a.nd 
use different devicca, including paper·and-pcncil examinations, 
video cameras, tape recorders, medical examinations and tests, 
and computers. Employe.ra have diverse interests in so doing. 
An e_mployer may seek to prevent tho following: computer 
" WA.n"Ctn A Orandei1. 1upra note 17, at l97~ Kim. 111prn note 20. at 1601: 
Poot. ••pro noto 60, al &M: Wilbom, 1upro no1<1 19, 01 83Z-33 
• Milditl, .. ,,,.. nGte 20, 11 98CHll !ql>Otin1 THOMAS ~I OOol.SY, A 
TUATl9 ON Tiii uw or TOltT9 Oii TIUI wao.~os WlllCll Aa.ISI l'"DlmlmlC."1' cw 
CO.orraACT 29 (2d td. 1888)~ - oho Watnn It Brandcis. '"""' note 17. al 207 
" M&kdial, ..,,.,.. """'20. al 98CHll (c:illn1 OOol.SY, '""'° D04oO 62, al 29). 
" l<lm. ..,,,,.. D04oO 20, at 1601, 1635. 
" W1lbom. 1upro """'19. 11831. 
" Stt. ,,.., Shaun B. Sponeer. R-oblc Bxp«tutlon• ond th• &wion o( 
Prlvoey, :19 &H 01£00 I.. R&v. 843. 912 (2002) rmt.. lhotkln1 Btl>temi.r 11 te"'°""t 
au.cb th-i.o to &kew the alreedy 14<1\IOUS balAllCe betw°"' pnvacy and -..n17 In 
ra- ol lhe l111er."); ~·ON! Pn'*Y. 18 11'1>1\'llXIAL £MJ' RTs. (BNA) 4 (2001) 
(dim-'i"OC - - ol oaliooal -..rity are erodlac pnvMy) 
• ~ "'P"O """' 19, .. :IO:I 
"' ld. ot306. 
• Poot, oupra noto 60, ol 1010. 
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crime; dissemination of trade secrets and confidential 
information to competitors; use of work time for personal 
activities and pursuits; and risky employee conduct that may 
result in imposition of liability on the employer for sexual 
harassment, defamation, or comput.er crime. Employers also 
have an interest in hi ring and promoting employees who are 
physically and mentally fit for particular jobs.• 
The privacy right of employees is hard to articulat.e in 
the abstract. It is the right to be left alone, but almost everyone 
would admit that the r.ight, never absolute to begin with, 
certainly is further circumscribed by the workplace and the 
employer's interests. Still, employee rights advocates insist 
that employees have a right of privacy that restricts an 
employer from knowing too much about them, controlling them 
too closely or emotionally hurting them." The following two 
subparts more particularly desc.ribe two types of invasion of 
privacy, electronic monitoring and genetic discrimination, 
respectively. 
a. Electronic Monitoring 
The most high-profile workplace privacy issue of the day 
is electronic monitoring of employee communications and 
activities. It is one of the most prevalent monitoring or 
surveillance t.ecbniques, permitting a level of •observation" not 
possible through other means"' and causing considerable 
• Regarding clect.ronJc monitoring, aee Keann, 111pro not.a 19, at 310-16 
(d.iscussing emJ)loycrt' rea1on1 ror conducting electronic rnonil.oring of emp)oyeea); 
Wat.eo.o., 1upra note 19, at. 101 (u.me); RJehman, &upro note 19 (di11euuing employers' 
need to monit.or to attempt. to avoid liability for 1ex-u1d haruame.nt, negligent birina. 
and ne.ctige.nt. rete.ntion in caaet of workplace violence). For diecuuioa of potential 
employer liobility ror the compu~r crimeo of employ..,, - renerally Mark ilhman, 
~I, Compulu Crimu and lh• Rnpond<OI Sup<rior Doctnne: Emp/oyon &won, 
6 8 .U. J . SCI. & TUR. L. 6 (2000). 
Recarding genetic te.tina. eee Kim, •upro note 20. at 1S3M2; Feldman & Katz.. •upro 
note 20, ot 396-97 CdiocuJlinr reaeons for employerw to conduct genetic teslinr of 
employees and to take employment actions based on teat mu.Ila). 
" Profe.aor Kim cit.ea Lhe following as core areas or privacy: one's body and 
bodily function•: perwonal Information relating to health and sexual matters; one'• 
home; and traditionally prlvllito communication&. See Klnl, 1upra note 17, at 700-01. 
• Kesan, 1upra note 19, at 305; aet o.110 Frayer, 1upra note 19, at 858-59 
(diacuuing Silentwat<:h by Adai, Inc., a software package that permit• moniwring that 
i1 1urprising in bot.h it.I breadth Md depth). C1earwwift'1 ?.UAtE1weeper software line 
lodudes MIMEsweeper, which audit.a individual Web traffic and warns offendt:l'I who 
MX'llBA inappropriate 1hee OT view/receive inappropriate ~mail content. &e 
http:/Jwww.mimeoweeper.eom/productalmsw/msw_webldefault.aJlp (bat visii..I Aug. 9, 
2003). SpectorSolt wuta it& Spector Pro aoftware package with, "When you Aboolu~ly 
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distress among employees." Furthermore, electronic monitoring 
is an area where technology has outstripped the law, leaving 
employees largely unprotected." Some types of electronic 
monitoring garnering the most attention are simultaneous 
monitoring of computers, such as keystroke monitoring, 
retrieval of e-mail messages and stored computer files, and 
mapping of Internet sites visited by employees. The 2001 
survey by the American Management Association showed that 
at least two-thirds of major U.S. firms engage in electronic 
monitoring. That number has doubled in the last five years." 
Ironically, when employees claim their employer has 
injured their dignity by electronic monitoring, employers 
sometimes respond that they are promoting civility and 
protecting the dignity of other employees. Thus, one person's 
invasive, disrespectful act is another's attempt to enforce 
respect. For example, in May 2000, Dow Chemical performed 
an e-mail audit at its Freeport, Texas plant and found that 254 
out of 5,500 employees had saved, filed, or sent sexual or 
otherwise inappropriate e-mail." Dow fired twenty employees, 
arguing that it was attempting to prevent sexual harassment 
and had developed policies to promote respect and 
responsibility." 
There are of course many other illustrative stories and 
lawsuits regarding electronic monitoring in the workplace. 
Consider the case of the insurance company executive fired just 
three days before his shares of stock, worth millions, were to 
vest. His employer said it fired him because he repeatedly 
accessed pornographic sites on the Internet while he was at 
work.• The executive contended that he did not intentionally 
need to know Eyervtbjng they a.re doing online." http://www.spectrosoft.com (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2002). Including eBloster 3.0 (for .. mail) and Spector (for computer 
screen snapshots), the package otTors "anapshot recording, Email recording, 
Chatlln&t.ant Message logs and sophisticated Keystroke journals." Id. 
"* \Vilbom, supra note 19, at 838. 
" Keean, •uprci note 19, at 304-05; Pat.rick Boyd, Note, Tipping the Balance 
of Power: Employer lntruaion on Emplf-O•ee Privacy Through Tech11ologkal lnnouation, 
14 ST. JOJtN'S J . LEGAi. COMMENT. 181, 182 (1999) ('Technological innovation .•. now 
permit.a employers to compromise their employees by violating their right to privacy in 
a way not anticipated by earlier laws."). 
M Am. Mmgt. Ass'o, 2001 Survey: Workplace. Afonitoring & SurueiUo.nct: 
Policies and Practices, supro note J9, 
M Panel Orders Dow C~cal to Reinstate a Dozen Workers Fired for E·Mail 
Abuse, DAILY LAB. REP. {BNA), Apr. 16, 2002 CNo. 73), ot A2. 
C7 Id. An arbitration panel ordered reinstatement of twelve of the discharged 
employees because of disparate enforcement of the policy by Dow. 
" TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v, Sup. Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 {Cal. Ct. App. 
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access the sites, but they simply "popped up" on his computer. 
He sued the employer for wrongful termination, arguing that 
the employer's stated reason was pretextuaJ.• 
The employer had provided him two computers, one to 
keep at work and one to keep at home. During discovery, the 
employer demanded production of the home computer with no 
deletions or alterations of any information stored on the hard 
drive. The plaintiff resisted, contending in part that he had a 
state constitutional right of privacy in the information stored 
on the computer's hard drive. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, 
be had signed the company's "electronic and telephone 
equipment policy statement.''" The collrt held that he had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in light of his voluntary 
waiver.'' The court also discussed that under the "community 
norms" of"21" Century computer-dependent businesses," major 
employers monitor, record, and review employee 
communications and activities." 'l'he case demonstrates that 
even when employers monitor to protect a legitimate interest, 
the results of the monitoring can be used as a pretext for an 
illegitimate or bad reason for an adverse employment action.'' 
b. Genetic Discrimination 
A second privacy issue is genetic testing" of employees, 
and adverse employment actions based on the information 
obtained from those tests.'' Llke electronic monitoring, genetic 
discrimination" has become possible in the workplace because 
2002). 
• Id. at 158. 
• Under the policy, be •rree<l oot to UH the aystema for penon1I or 
noncompany purposes unlu1 axpre11ly Approved. and not to uae them for •improper, 
deropt.ory, dcf3matory, Obscene Or bi.her in&pproprfnto purposes." Id, nt 157. 
' ' Id. at.164. 
" Id.. ot 161~2. 
n Kaan. 1upro note 19. at 320 (•Abuse may allo take the form ofvoyeuriam, 
union-buaUng, fernting out. whistleblowen, 8nd creaLing pretenaet to fire membera of 
prot,cctcd omployec group1."). 
•• "Ge..neUc te&Linl(' and "'genetic infonnationtt do not have uniformly acccptM 
1ne1ninp in the la.nguqe of the genetic acie.oce1. Feldman & Kati.. 1upro note 20. at 
410 nn.18&-89. Most •nacted and propooed 1tatui.. and polici .. indude d<!linitiona. 
Commentato·n have distinguished bee.ween genetic .ueening, a one--time tell to 
determine whether one hae a genetic prcdi,,position or dle:ease, and genetic monitoring, 
involving periodic te.t.11 to increase workplace 111111\lt.y and protoct the health or 
emplo)'ff&. /d. al 395-96. 
• Stt tf<Mrolfy Feldman & Kall<, 1upro noi. 20. 
" Profeuor Kim argues lhot a privacy righll model ofren • better framework 
for add:res1ing genetic discrimination t.han the anti·diacrimination model. Kim, 1upta 
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of advances in science and technology. It also has been the 
subject of proposed legislation at the federal and state levels." 
It has not been as pervasive as electronic monitoring because it 
is not as cheap and easily available as computer monitoring, 
and its reliability is still suspect." However, the financial 
incentives to make genetic testing more broadly available 
suggest that this type of privacy invasion will increase." 
As a general matter, employers' use of tests to invade 
the privacy of employees is not new.•• In 1988, Congress all but 
banned the use of polygraphs by employers in the Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act." Likewise, drug tests are often 
challenged under federal" and state constitutions, state drug 
testing laws, and common law tort theories." Through statutes 
and common law, some states have restricted the use ofpaper-
and-pencil tests and other types of honesty and psychological 
profile tests." However, genetic testing is a uniquely powerful 
issue that poses special challenges because of the depth of the 
invasion, which reaches into the secrets of one's biological 
makeup, and because of the breadth of information that genetic 
testing can provide. 
The Human Genome Project began in 1990, and within 
ten years the once unthinkable bad been accomplished - the 
"genetic map" was essentially complete." Now it is possible to 
use a piece of hair, a drop of blood or other sliver of genetic 
material to obtain extensive genetic information about a 
person."' Many good results are likely to flow from this 
scientific marvel, as scientists may be able to identify potential 
diseases and conditions," and someday perhaps even work with 
note 20, at 1502. 
" See infra Part U .A.3.b. 
" Feldman & Kat., •upra note 20, at 389 & n.3; Kim, aupra note 20, at 1511. 
111 Makdisi, ttupro. noto 20, nt 972; Miller, &upra note 20, at 235-37. 
80 Wukitach, supra note 20, at 42·43. 
" 29 U.S.C. ff 2001-2009 (2000). Although the Act provides for 
circumstances under which employers can polygraph employee1:1, the requirements are 
so stringent as to make the provisions virtually useless. 
" See, e.g., Nat1 Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989). 
" See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nab<>ro Al .. ka Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Ala. 
1989). 
5' See ge11eroJly David C. Yamada, The Regulation of Pre·Employmenl 
HoM.ty Testing: Striking a Temporary (1) Balance BelWttn Self-Regulation and 
ProhibUion, 89 WAYNEL. REY. 1549 (1998). 
116 Kim, supra note. 20, at 1497; Makdisi, supra note 20, at 965-66. 
"' Makdisi. 3upro note 20, at 965-66. 
" See, e.g., Miller, 1upra note 20, at 226. 
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those genes to treat or prevent a disease. However, some bad 
results may also follow. Employers can and have used new 
technology to obtain genetic information about employees.• 
There are many reasons why employers may want to perform 
tests and obtain genetic information.• Some are rompletely 
benign, such as complying with the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act, and identifying employees whose health or safety 
may be endangered, or who may endanger the health or safety 
of others by working in particular jobs or environments ... Yet 
other reasons strike at the hea.rt of employees' fears: making 
hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and other employment 
decisions based on the information." 
Specifically, employers would be inclined to take 
adverse employment actions, such as refusing to hire, firing, or 
denying health care roverage to individuals who tested positive 
for certain genes that predisposed one to disease. Incentives 
abound for employers to cull and use genetic information, such 
as lowering the costs of health care, workers' compensation 
costs, lost time under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 
accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act, and 
training expenses and other investments in employees with 
little longevity." The incentives are not merely theoretical -
there is evidence that such employment discrimination has in 
fact occurred.• Quite apart from the invasion of privacy and its 
impact on adverse employment decisions, but equally 
disconcerting, genetic discrimination also has a side effect that 
undercuts employee health. Survey evidence indicates that 
employees fear such employment discrimination and would 
refuse testing based on those fears, thus foregoing the potential 
ben.efits of preventing or decreasing the chance of developing 
diseases." 
'" s .. Feldman & Kotz, 1upra note 20, at 893 (oxplaininr that the following 
three conditions can be determined from gonatlc loaling: (i) person has genetic derect 
that ha1 caused or will cause a diaeaae; (ii) penon 11 a canior of disease or genetic 
defect; and (ill) porooo h88 predi>po•ilion lO developlnr a dioea1e). 
1639-42. 
'" &., e.g., Kim, •upra nolO 20, at 11139-42. 
• SH Feldman & Katz, •upra not.e 20, at 396·97; Kim, •upra note 20, at 
" SH Feldman & Katz, supra nou 20, at 397. 
" Id. ot 397·98 (citinJ .. .,,., of lh ... reuona). 
• Miller. 1upro note 20, 11-t 237 (citinc 1urvey or genetic ee:rvices providers 
and primaiy bullh care physicians who "'ported lmowlDf 682 people who were denied 
employment or inaurance coverage becaUM of !heir aeoolic pndi.apocitiooa). 
" Kim, supra note 20, ot IS42-43; M.iller, ••pro note 20, et 233; Wukitsch, 
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In the most notorious reported incident of alleged 
genetic testing of employees, a group of thirty-six railway 
workers employed by Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway 
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) alleging that their employer had 
genetically tested them without their consent or knowledge." 
The employees claimed to have reported to their employer that 
they suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. In turn, the 
employer required them to submit to a medical examination by 
non-company health care providers. Instead of being limited to 
an examination for carpal tunnel syndrome, the examination 
included a blood test for genetic markers. Consequently, the 
EEOC filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act." 
The EEOC and the employer ultimately settled the case, with 
the employer denying that it had engaged in illegal testing and 
agreeing to pay 2.2 million dollars. Prior to settling, the 
company agreed to stop genetic testing." 
2. Protecting Privacy: Inadequacy of Current Law 
One may view the law protecting employee privacy as 
consisting of "bits and pieces of legislation and of a melange of 
common law categories - rife with silences, doctrinal gaps, and 
inconsistencies ... in other words, a mess.- That assessment 
stems from the comparative lack of governing principles, such 
as those found in German law.• The following two subparts 
survey and critique the capacity of extant law to effectively 
meet the challenges posed by electronic monitoring and genetic 
testing. 
1upro note 20. at 40; Feldman & Katz, 1upro note 20, ot 895 & n.56; Hugheo, 1upra 
nolo 20, at 36-37. 
" EEOC'• First Genetic Teoting Challenge, 1upro note 20; Molly McDonough, 
EEOC TUach<• $2.2 Million Settl<m~nt with l!oilrood, 21 ABA J, E·REP. l (2002). 
" EEOC v. Burlington N. and Santo Fe Ry. Co., No. 02.C4156 <N.D. Iowa). 
" Presa Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportuni\y Commiuion, EEOC 
and BNSF Set.tie Genetic Testing Ceso Under Americans with Diaabilitieo Act (May 8, 
2002), auoi/able at http://www.eooc.gov/pres815·8·02.html; ace al•o McDonough, aupro 
note 95. 
• FINKIN,•upro not.e 17, at xxi. 
" Id. at u & n_lO (citing IOUJ'CH), The Buie Law of the Fede1'111 Republic of 
Q{irmany stat.es that the •secrecy or post and telecommunication are inviolable.'" THE 
BASIC LAw (GRUNOOESETZ~ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GJ!:RIMNV art. 10(1) (Axel Tscllentochcr tran•., 2003). For a brief summary of German 
law on workph•ce privacy, see Keaao, 8upra note 19, at 309·10. 
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a. Electronic Monitoring 
Currently, both federal and state laws regulate 
electronic monitoring of employees. AIJ an important initial 
division, public employees enjoy protection beyond their private 
counterparts because public employees have privacy 
protections in both the federal and state constitutions.• In only 
a single state - California - does the state constitutional right 
of privacy extend to private sector employees."' Additionally, 
statutory protection is provided by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),"' which amended 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safo Streets Act of 
1968,'"' also know as the Federal Wiretap Act. 
At the state level, many state statutes more or less 
track the ECPA. However, at the time the ECPA was enacted, 
Internet and e-mail monitoring were not major issues. 
Generally, Title I of the Act"' prohibits the interception of wire, 
oral, and electronic communications, while Title II"' prohibit& 
accessing stored communications. AIJ promising as those brief 
descriptions sound for employees, for many reasons the ECPA 
hos proven largely ineffective in addressing the current issues 
in computer and electronic monitoring."" Because the state 
statutes are modeled on the federal law, most share the federal 
,. Wilbom, 1upro note 19, at 886-73; l<ft•n, 1upro note 19, at 294-95; Kim, 
1upm note 17, at 703-06. 
"' Hill v. Nat1 Coll•,giate Athletic Aa .. n, 865 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1994); see al•o 
Kc1an, 1upro note 19, at 294 (1toting that 'Callfomla 11 tho only s tate granting 
constitutional privacy right.I t.o private 11&ctor workers"). 
'" Pub. L. No. 99·508, 100 Stat. 1S48 (1986) (codifiod aa amended in scattered 
1e<.'tions of 18 U.S.C.). 
'"' Pub. L. No. 9().351, 82 Stet. 197, 211-25 (1963) (codifled ••amended at 18 
U.S.C., ff 2510.2522 and 47 U.S.C. f 605 (2000)), 
"' lS u.s.c. H 2610.2521 <2000>. 
* 1s u.s.c. H 2701-2711 <2000>. 
* Kesa.n, 1upro note 19. at 295--99; Wilborn, 1upro n0l4 19, at 83Ml; 
Robinoon, •upro note 19, at 313·20; Richman, 1upro note 19, at 1349·50; Watson, 1upro 
note 19, at 87·88. 0111 obetacle about which the.re ha1 bean 1ome liti.gation is whet.her 
the monitoring of e-mail• canatitutes an ''intercepUon• within lhe meaning of the 
ECPA. See Robin1an, 1upra note 19, at 314-16. The determinative factor may be 
whet.her tlle e-mail is in tron1lt or in storage. Id. at 315. See alao Frayer, supra note 19, 
at 866-67 (discussing the few judicial interpretations of"'intercep..-). Even if a plaintiff 
i• able to est8blish an interception under a court'& int.erpret.atlon of the term, however, 
there are several exceptlon1 that poee formidable hurdl11. Sn. 1.g ., Kesan, supra note 
19, at 296-98; Robin10n, •upro note 19, at 316-18. But - Smith v. Devon, 01-T·Ml·N, 
2002 WL 75800 CM.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002) (revening summary judpient in favor of the 
clefend<ont emplo>"'r on a Fedora) Wiretap Act dalm). 
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statute's limitations regarding protection against computer 
monitoring."" 
Although often overlooked in debates about computer 
monitoring, one federal statute that may provide some 
protection is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."' Most 
obviously, it is an unfair labor practice to conduct surveillance 
of union activities in a workplace where employees are 
represented by a union, or where union organizing is being 
conducted."" Thus, if an employer is conducting general 
moni toring, a.nd employees are discussing union organizing or 
other union activities, the employer may have committed an 
unfair labor practice in violation of§ 8(aXl) of the NLRA.'" 
The lesser-known aspect of the NLRA is that all 
employees, whether represented by a union or not, with the 
exceptions specifically enumerated in the Act, have the right 
under § 7'" to engage in concerted activities for purposes of 
collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection. "For purposes 
of mutual aid or protection" hos been interpreted broadly to 
include most matters relating to terms or conditions of 
employment."' Thus, monitoring of employees who are 
discussing work conditions via e-mail may be an unfair labor 
practice. Establishing rules prohibiting such communications 
also may constitute an unfair labor practice.'" 
Turning to common law, the tort of invasion of privacy 
also applies to computer monitoring."' There are four branches 
or versions of the tort: intrusion upon seclusion; public 
disclosure of private facts; false light; and appropriation of 
name or likeness."' The branch relevant in the employment 
,., Richmon, rupra not.e 19, at 1350-.62. Counooticut ia an exception, as it 
enact.ed a law t.hat. roquirel employen to give emptoyee1 prior written notification or 
electronic monltorin1. CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. f 31 -CSdCbXll (Weot2000). 
• 29 U.S .C. ff 161-169 (2000). ~rdin1 applicability of the NLRA IO 
elecuonic invuiono of privacy, ..., William R. Corbetl, Wailing for IM Labor Law of 
1114 fu~nty-Fi,..t C1ntury: Bwrythinl Old I• N•w A1ai11, 23 BERKEUY J . EMP. I< LAB. 
L. 269 (2002); Froyer, •upra note 19, at 862-6<1. 
,,. l Tl18 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE 
NATIONA~ LABOR RELATIONS Acr 127 (Patrick Hardin od., 3d ed. 1992). 
" ' 29 U.S.C. I 158(a)(I) (2000). 
'" 29 u.s.c. I 157 (2000). 
"' See Corbett. aupro note 108, at 282·83. 
'~ Id. at 291 -95. 
114 Ketan, aupro note 19, at302--04: Kim, 1upro note 17, at 688-98. 
in Kenn. •upro note 1.9, at 802.-0C; Kim, 1upro. note 17, at 688-98: 
REsTATE>IENT (8t;COllD) OF '!'ORTS§ 652A (1977); Hl!llRY R. PERl!nT, JR., WORKJ'UCB 
TORTS: RJG11111I<l..IABIUIIES198 (1991i 
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context is intrusion upon seclusion."' The tort's three prima 
facie elements are: (1) an intentional invasion or intrusion; (2) 
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) occurring 
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.'" On the 
whole, employees suing their employers for the tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion have fared about as poorly as employees suing 
their employers for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED).'" 
The weak track record exists for two reasons. First, the 
requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person prevents trivial privacy invasions from being 
actionable."' This element is roughly analogous to the outrage 
element in intentional infliction of emotional distress. It seems, 
however, that courts have not set the bar as high for "highly 
offensive• as they have for "outrageous." An intrusion must be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, whereas for outrage to 
be satisfied, the act must be such that civilized society should 
not tolerate it. Plaintiffs often plead both llED and invasion of 
privacy when complaining of abuse in the workplace. However, 
the outrage element is too difficult to satisfy when the act 
complained of is electronic monitoring.'" 
Most invasion of privacy claims in the employment 
context fail because courts find either that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, or that the invasion would 
not be highly offensive to a reasonable person, or both.'" 
Attorneys and consultants routinely advise employers to 
establish written e-mail and computer use policies, to tell 
employees that they can and will be monitored,"' and to have 
no Kcsan, supra note 19, at 302; Kim, supra note 17, Bt 688. Prafassor 
Makdisi describes the intrusion upon seclusion branch as being more aligned with 
dignitary in1Jult, whereaa the other three are aligned with property-like elienation 
issues. Ma.kdisi, aupra note 20, at 983. 
'" 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE I.Aw OF TORTS§ 426, at 1200 (2001). 
1~ See ge1utraUy Kim, &upro note 17. 
Ht Su PERRl1T, supro note 115, at 204.05; Kim, supra note 17, at 691-92; 
Kesan, 1upra note 19, at 302-03. 
•• ~san, 1upra note 19, at 302; see a/$0 Smith v. Devers, Ol·T·55l·N, 2002 
WL 75803 <M.O. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant employer on invasion of privacy claim, but affirming on llED claim). 
111 The line between the two elements is indistinct, and courts: oft.en ble.nd 
them int.o one in their analysis. Kesan, aupra note 19, at 302; se.e olso PERRJTI', 1upro 
note 115, at 203-04. 
111 Stt, e.g., Spencer, supra. note 56, at 870 (Lawye.ra "routinely advisa their 
clients to deny employees any expectation of privacy."); Focus On. . . . Employtt Priuacy, 
lNDMDUAI. EMPL. RIGHTS (BNA), Aug. 6, 2002 (No. 18), at 72 (diS<:Ussing 
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employees sign an acknowledgment regarding the policy.'" 
Nevertheless, even without such policies, courts often find that 
the employees cannot have a reasonable expectation of much 
privacy in the workplace.'" Perhaps the most extreme example 
is in Smyth u. Pillsbury Co.,"' in which the court rejected the 
plaintifl's privacy expectation even though the employer had 
assured employees that it would not monitor e-mail and use 
information obtained to discipline or fire employees.'" 
Moreover, even if courts conclude that an employee has or may 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, they still may hold 
that tho intrusion is not highly offensive because the 
employer's interests outweigh the employee's privacy rights.'" 
A second problem with the intrusion tort is the Catch-22 
that occurs when employers attempt to invade a zono of 
privacy. If the employee blocks the invasion, then the employee 
often is fired and cannot successfully sue because no privacy 
invasion occurred.''" Alternatively, if the employee permits the 
intrusion to occur, a claim for invasion of privacy often fails on 
the rationale that the employee consented to the intrusion.'" 
Commentators generally have concluded that ex:isting 
law is inadequate to address abusive electronic monitoring in 
the workplace. One scholar summarized his review of the 
federa1 and state law by saying that law in the United States 
attomeyllpe1ker'1 •dvlce to human rftOUrtt man•cera to Cuhioo and oommun.lclte a 
dear policy thftl ·r ... rv( .. J lhe right IO .. an:h and d .. 1rey any reuonable upecllllon 
of privacy" ). Stt allO Oarri1y v. John Hancock Mut. Lire Ina. Co., 2002 WL 9'14676 (0 . 
Mft81. May 7, 2002). 
iu Kc8nn, 11iprn not.c 19, aL S04~0l5 ("AL con1mon J3w, then, an employor n1ay 
insulate ltaolr lrom liobility by inrormint; omploycee of n monitoring program.'">. 
• ~• Id, nl 305; \Vilborn, ""pro note 10, Al 846 (Tor example. an employee'• 
offioe, desk, or lockor may be held to be tho omploy•r'• proporty and thu1, not 
private."). Stt a/IJO M•kdioi, supra nou. 20, at 993·1002 (writing about application or 
intnasion upon IOUl.ude to genetic telting and recommending a.broptJon of • 
mechanical applicalloo of the "public placeo rule" - courta gn.nt aummary judpent In 
....., In which lho all.,..t intrusioo oc:cumicl In a public place, on the ntionale that 
there can be DO Oll~lion or privacy in a public place), 
,.. 914 F. Supp. 97 CE.D. Pa. 1996). 
1
• Id. at. 101 ('"(W)e do not find a reuonablo expectation or privacy in e~ma.il 
communication• voluntarily made by an employee to his eupervisor over the company 
e·mail sysW1u not.withstanding any assura.ncea thal 1uch communications would nol be 
in~rcoptcd by mnnngemenl."). 
01 Ser, ~.g .• Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at •2. (•Even if plaintiffs hnvo n 
reasonable cxpcc:t.ation or privacy in the.ir work e-mail, defendant's legitimate bu1ine11 
intereet in prot.ec:tJng its employees from hara11ment in the workplace would likely 
trump plaintiff•' privacy inU!resu."). 
'" Stt, 41., Luedlke v. Nabors Alaaka Drilling, Inc., 768 P .2d 1123 (Alaaka 
1989); Kim, 1upro note 17, at 675-76. 
"" Stt. •4 .. Liredtlu, 168 P.2d 1123; Kim, wpro note 17, ot 676. 
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does not protect "a zone of privacy in the workplace.""' 
Although that conclusion seems too severe, if he means there is 
no absolute right of privacy that will prevail regardless of the 
interests the employer throws onto the scales, then it is 
certainly true that the zone is minuscule. Indeed, the legal 
approach in the United States has been to individually address 
each method or device used to invade privacy rather than 
trying to protect a zone of privacy against invasion by all 
means or devices.uo The only general source of privacy 
protection for most employees in the private sector is the 
common law."' 
b. Genetic Discrimination 
As with electronic monitoring and other privacy issues, 
public employees can state claims for invasion of privacy under 
the Constitution, although the Supreme Court has not yet 
decided a case involving an individual's privacy interest in her 
genetic information."' There is no federal legislation that 
explicitly prohibits genetic testing of employees or 
discrimination against them on the basis of information 
obtained by such testing."" There is a federal statute, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HlPAA), .. which generally prohibits group health insurance 
plans from using genetic information to make rules regarding 
initial eligibility or continued eligibility for coverage.•• 
However, while relevant to the employment setting because 
most employees have health coverage through their 
employers,"' HIPAA does not prohibit employers from 
requesting or requiring employees to submit to genetic testing, 
or from discriminating in employment on the basis of genetic 
information. 
Also at the federal level, President Clinton issued 
Executive Order Number 13,145, entitled "To Prohibit 
m Kesan, 1upro note 19, at 322. 
'" Kim, aupro nol.e 17, at 674. 
'" Id. aL675. 
"' llliller, aupra nol.e 20, at 251·52. 
"'Id. at237. 
"' Pub. L. No. 104- 191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in 
ocatlered oecliona or lS U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.l. 
"' llliller, wpro DOie 20, at 255; Feldman & Katz, 1uprv note 20, at 400-07. 
m S.,. Kim, IUpt'O DOie 20, at 1502. 
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Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic 
Information."'" The Executive Order prohibits discrimination 
based on protected genetic information in all civilian federal 
government employment."' The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also has interpreted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to prohibit genetic 
discrimination ... As recounted above, tho EEOC has settled the 
one case in which it filed suit for genetic discrimination under 
the ADA."' The crux of the EEOC interpretation is that genetic 
defects and predisposition to diseases or conditions can be 
covered under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of 
"disability."'" Whether courts will defer to the EEOC's 
interpretation of the ADA remains to be seen."' Title VT1 may 
also be invoked in a case of genetic discrimination if a case can 
be made under the disparate impact theory, but that depends 
on establishing a high correlation between the incidence of a 
particular genetic marker or predisposition, and a protected 
class under Title VU.'" 
At the state level, thirty-one states hove enacted one or 
more statutes addressing genetic testing and its uses in the 
workplace."' Thero is a wide variety among the statutes in the 
extent to which they restrict employers from requesting or 
requiring genetic testing nod using such information to make 
employment decisions.'• 
As with electronic monitoring, the tort theory of 
invasion of privacy may also be applied to genetic testing. 
Although there are no reported decisions of this type, the 
theory has been applied to drug and other types of testing, and 
'"' Exec. Order No. 13, 146, 6S Fed. R•i· 8,877 (t'cb. 8, 2000). 
•• Miiier, 1upro not.o 20, aL 249. 
•• Id. aL 238-47 (c:it.lnf 2 U.S. EEOC, COMPLIANCB MANV.U... Order 916.002, 
at 90245 (1995)~ 
... s.. ••pTO ....... 9W'T and _.,.ti)'! .. ~ 
•• lohll4r, aupro note20,ot23847; Kim,1upra noc.a20, at 1514. 
'" MJllA!r, 1upro note 20, al 241 (llalln1 that "I.be £EOC"1 lntorpntive 
Guidance can be u11ed •• per1u11ive authority" but "the guidance doet not have the 
same force O( hlW 81 A roderal 1tatut.a Of regulation'"), 
14
• Khn, 1upra note 20, nt 1613; Miller, 1upro note 20, at 247 .. 8: Feldman & 
Kau, 1upra note 20, •L 404-05. 
0
' Sa Nat1 Human Genome Ree. lnlt., Report on Employment 
Discrimination Stole Legitlltion, al http://www.nhfri.nih.gov/Po!icy_aod_public_ 
alfain/Legi1lolionlworltplace.htm (Ian visi~ AUJ. 3, 2003) !hereinafter NHCRI 
Website). 
•• Set, •41 .. MiUer, 1upro note 20, at U9'63 lowveying aute lqialation); 
Feldman & Kall, 1upra note 20, ol410.16 (same~ 
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should fare at least as well with genetic testing.'" Indeed, at 
least one commentator's survey of the intrusion upon seclusion 
cases imbues her with optimism regarding the flexibility of the 
intrusion tort and its application to genetic testing."' Another, 
while not specifically calling for a common law tort response, 
argues that genetic discrimination should be treated as an 
issue of protecting employee privacy.•• 
In sum, there is existing statutory and common law that 
applies to both of these emerging types of workplace privacy 
invasion. On balance, however, many commentators deem this 
law inadequate to address the problems. With respect to 
statutes, only the recently enacted state statutes on genetic 
testing and discrimination expressly refer to one of these types 
of invasions. For all of the other statutes, courts may interpret 
them as applicable to these invasions or they may not. 
As for the tort theories, principally invasion of privacy, 
the inadequacy stems from courts generally favoring 
employers' interests over employees' privacy interests, and 
consequently skewing the tort doctrine and analysis in favor of 
employers. Given the dearth of protection afforded employees 
by existing law in the face of scientific and technological 
developments that can penetrate deeply into areas of employee 
privacy, it was predictable that commentators and employee 
rights advocates would propose new law. Given the history of 
employment law in this country, it also is not surprising that 
most have favored new legislation rather than adjustments to 
existing common law. 
"' Maltdl1l, 1upro oote 2.0, ot 1002-12. Althouih noL an •mplo,nil'Dt cue, the 
•p.,UC.tion of the lnu1ion or privoey I.oft LO dand .. tlne cenetlc totting ucse in Doe v. 
Hieb·Tech lnlL, Inc., 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. CL App. 1998). ln lhat case, a atudent rave 
• blood sample for a rubeU• lftt, ond lhe aample a.loo WH tfftod ror HIV without hi• 
knowledge or conaent. '"-• court characterized pla.intirrs Intrusion upon seclu.1ion 
claim aa ~mprope.r appropriation of private information reeulting from the HIV teet 
t.hat waa performed without hla knowledge or coo1ent.." Id. at 1066. Fi.nding a privacy 
interest in a person'• blood aa.mp1e and the information thnt may be gleaned from it, 
the court went on to hold that tho unauthorized test.inr would be found by a reasonable 
person to be highly oO'en•l•e. ld. at 1071. 
141 Makdiai, 1upl'O note 20, at 1019 C'"IT)h& intrusion tort is a viable mean.a of 
pm1erving privacy rirhta. i.n a variety of cont.ext.a and . . . it ha1 been enlarged U> 
coolider mono apodalired .. tqories of intruaiona, induding auual baraument ond 
drur testing In the omployment eootext. "). 
,. Kim, •upl'O note 20, at 1551. 
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3. Protecting Privacy: Proposals 
a. Electronic Monitoring 
Legislation has been introduced at the federal and state 
levels to regulate electronic monitoring of employees. The 
general thrust of proposed legislation has been not to restrict 
monitoring to specific circumstances (such as when an 
employer has a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing), but 
instead to require employers to give notice to employees of 
their monitoring practices. The first legislation proposed st the 
federal level was the ill-fated Privacy for Consumers and 
Workers Act (PCWA).'" It was principally, but not exclusively, 
a notice bill."' Despite being approved by a House 
subcommittee,'" the bill died what one commentator termed a 
"mysterious death" in committee.'" 
The progeny of the PCWA rose up in 2000 with the 
introduction in Congress of the Notice of Electronic Monitoring 
Act (NEMA).'" NEMA was less a.mbitious and even less 
restrictive than the PCWA - a "lean and mean" notice bill.'" It 
did not prohibit any kind of monitoring, but required notice 
when an employee begins employment and then annual 
renotification.'" The notice had to cover the following: the form 
of communication or computer use to be monitored; how the 
monitoring would be done; the kinds of information that would 
be obtained; the frequency of monitoring; and how the gathered 
information would be used.'" Size and attitude of the lean and 
mean bill notwithstanding, NEMA, like its progenitor, died in 
Congress, the victim oflobbying by business interests.'" 
"' H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993). The bills were 
introduced in the 1989-90 term and in subsequent terma, but no hearinp were held. 
\Vilbom, supro noto 191 at 849 n.94. 
'"' Wilborn, supro note 19, at 849-50~ Fr-ayer, aupra note 19, at 869. 
151 Labor Subpanel Approves Mea1ure to Curt0-il Electronic Moni.toring, DAILY 
LAB. REP. (BNAJ, Feb. 24, 1994 (No. 36), at Dl4. 
i iu Frayer, Bllpra note 19, at 868; see also Wilborn, supra note 19, at 851 n.105 
(noting the committeee in which the bills stalled and died). 
•M aR. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000). For detailed discussion• of the bill, see 
Watson. supra note 19, and Frayer, 1upra note 19. 
>»Frayer.supra note 19, at.869. 
tM Id. at 870; Watson, supra note 191 at 93. 
"' H.R. 4908, 106th Cong.§ 27U(b)(lH4J (2001). 
1~ Business Coalition Bl.ocks !tfarkup of Bill Requiring Electronic MonUoring 
Notification, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNAJ, Sept. 15, 2000 (No. 180), at A9; Frayer, supra 
note 19, at 871. 
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State legislation to require notice has also been 
proposed. In 2001, for the third consecutive year, the California 
legislature passed an electronic monitoring notice bill,'" and for 
the third time in three years Democratic Governor Gray Davis 
vetoed the bill.'" The bill would have required employers to 
notify employees either in writing or electronically of the 
employer's workplace privacy and electronic monitoring policies 
and practices."' Governor Davis, in the message accompanying 
bis veto, recognized the legitimate need for employers to 
monitor and stated, ''This bill places unnecessary and 
complicating obligations on employers and may lead to 
litigation by affected employees over whether the required 
notice was provided and whether it was read and understood 
by the employee.""' 
Some commentators favor a legislative approach to 
electronic monitoring, while others favor a notice law such as 
NEMA."' Professor S. Elizabeth Wilborn, for example, favors a 
legislative solution, but does not think that the PCWA did 
enough because it was primarily a notice bill that would not 
have restricted the amount or scope of monitoring.'" She favors 
comprehensive federal legislation that expressly states that 
employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
workplace, requires employers to demonstrate a legitimate 
business interest in order to justify monitoring, requires 
employers who satisfy that burden to use the least intrusive 
means of monitoring available, and creates incentives for 
employers to use content-neutral monitoring techniques."' 
Another commentator favors, as part of larger privacy reforms, 
federal privacy legislatiorl that limits the circumstances under 
which employers could electronically monitor, and prohibits 
"' S. 147, 107th Cong. (2001). 
"
0 Priuacy Bi.U for En1ployee E-A1ail Vetoed for Third Time by Cal-ifor11ia. Gou. 
Davi•, DAILY !..AB. REP. <BNA), Oct. 11, 2001 (No. 195) !hereinafter Privacy Bill for 
Employee E-!tfCJitJ. See ge11~rally Keaan, supra note 19 (discussing state and federal law 
applicable to electronic monitoring). 
"' S.147, 107th Cong. (2001). 
141 Privacy BiJl for Employee E-J\fail, 1u1.pra. note 160. 
"* Frayer, 1upro note 19, at874 (recommending p.a.saage ofNE?.W• Richman, 
•upra note 19, at 1361 ( .. A s tatute like the PCWA would a.end a strong message to 
employers and employee& about liability for harms created by workers and the right to 
workplace privacy . . . ."')i WaUJon, supra note 19, at 101 (stating that NEMA 
represented a "'significant compromise by both sides in the debate•) . 
... Wilborn, supro note 19, at 851. 
,., Id. at 880-81. 
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employment policies and agreements in which employees agree 
to such monitoring."' 
Most commentators hold out little hope for state 
legislative solutions for reasons such as business groups' 
lobbying and the ill fit between law limited by state boundaries 
and technology that realizes boundariless co=unication."' At 
least one commentator has suggested that a federal notice law 
that provides little privacy protection could provide impetus for 
passage of more protective state legislation."' 
Other commentators favor using the common law to 
address monitoring. One possibility is a tort approach that 
recognizes a public policy of employees' privacy rights in the 
workplace, end uses the tort theory of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy to limit the employment-at-will 
doctrine... Another proposal is a contract approach 
incorporating principles that permit employers and employees 
to achieve their legitimate expectations in monitoring and 
privacy, respectively.'" 
b. Genetic Discrimination 
There are numerous calls for federal legislation on 
genetic discrimination, many by emending Title VIT or the 
ADA.'" The Clinton administration, for example, called for 
federal legislation banning genetic testing in employment.'" 
Even the former Commissioner of the EEOC, Paul Miller, said 
that "additional legislation may be needed," notwithstanding 
the EEOC's position that the ADA covers genetic 
discrimination."' Several bills on genetic testing and genetic 
discrimination in insurance and employment have been 
• Spencer, 1upro note 66. at 912 . 
.., Kaan, eupro note 19, et 301--02; Wilborn, eupro note 19, aL 842-43. 
,. Frayer, eupro note 19, at S74 (recommendin1 pauage or NEMA, "which 
would serve u tho foundation and in&pinat.ion ror more exP1tn.1ive st.ate and federal 
legisltttion in the future•). 
1
• Kim, 1upro note 17, at 720·29. 
1
'
11 Kcton, 1111pro note 19, at 322·32. 
'" Feldman & Kotz, •upro note 20; Brion M. Holt, Comment, O.neli<:alcy 
Ikftctive: The Judicial ln1erpretation of tlJe Amtrica.n1 with Diso.bililit1 Act FaU• to 
Prollet Agairut 0.n•fiJ: IA.crimination in the Wor•plooe , 35 J . MARSRAU. L . REV. ~57 
(2002); WuklLICh, eupro note 20. 
111 Miller. 1.u.pro note 20, at 264. 
m M.iUer. 1upro note 20, at 265. 
118 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69: 1 
introduced since 1997.'" In the most recent session of Congress, 
although the Bush administration announced it supported 
genetic discrimination legislation,"' the bills bogged down in 
House and Senate committees under questions of overlap with 
the ADA, HIPAA, and other laws.'" 
One commentator, addressing genetic privacy beyond 
the employment context, viewed the tort theory of invasion of 
privacy, primarily the intrusion upon seclusion branch, as 
adequate to address the problems if the theory were tweaked.'" 
While not specifying whether she favors a legislative or 
common law approach, Professor Pauline Kim argues that 
genetic intrusion is better addressed under a privacy rights 
model than an anti-discrimination model.'" In discussing a 
number of the issues under a privacy rights model, Kim did not 
create a template for legislation.'" Kim, who also has written 
about electronic monitoring, favored a common law approach to 
that invasion of privacy issue,'"' because it involves balancing of 
interests and is thus ill-suited to a statutory approach. 
Most proposals for new law to address electronic 
monitoring and genetic testing and discrimination have been 
legislative approaches. The principal weakness of this approach 
is that it does not recognize that statutes lack the flexibility 
required to balan.ce the interests of employers and employees in 
matters of privacy. General or specific prohibitions can be 
articulated in statutes, but such unqualified prohibitions are 
not necessary or desirable in this area. By and large, 
commentators and law reformers have selected a tool too blunt 
for this delicate job, which requires calibrating that can only be 
achieved through the common law. 
'" Id.; Feldman & Katz., supra note 20, ot 409. 
1
" See Dernocrat.a ~Velcome Buslt., StaJen1ent on Genetic Discriniin.(Jtion 
Legi•lation, DAILY LAB. REP. (8NA), June 26, 2001(No.122), ot A8. 
115 Stn. Kenn.ttly to Addresa Genetic 8iC18 Bil1'11 Overlap of ADA, PrilJtlty 
&gulationB, DAILY LAB. R£P. (8NAl, July 26, 2001 (No. 143), at Al; Overlap in Genetic 
Bicu Le.gi$lC1tion 11 Examined i.n House H~ori,,g o" BiU, DAILY W. REP. (BNA), July 
12, 2001 (No. 133), at A8. 
111 11.takdisi, 1upra note 20, at 97S..79 (''As in many other areas where 
statutory protections are inadequate to guard against a perceived harm, the viability of 
common law actions for intrusion upon genet-ic privacy is critical."). 
111 Kim, supra note 20, at 1551. 
119 Id. at 1543. 
1JO See supra notes 16S.. 70 and accompanying text.. 
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B. Bullying 
1. Bullying: Definition and Examples 
Workplace bullying may be the "corporate buzzword for 
tho new millennium, pushing sexual harassment from its 
perch.""' The problem has virtually spawned an industry of its 
own. There are organizations that maintain websites, conduct 
conferences, and sponsor legislation to eradicate workplace 
harassment .... There are companies that will perform audits, 
identify bullying in workplaces, and attempt to eliminate it."' 
Reports of workplace abuse are legion, ranging from the 
insensitive to the utterly inhumane. A recent cause oolllbre is 
by no means the worst case, but it does demonstrate the 
senseless workplace meanness often perpetrated by the 
powerful upon the powerless. According to the complaint of 
Jodee Berry, a waitress at a Hooters restaurant in Panama 
City, Florida, management announced that the waitress who 
sold the most beer in a month would win a Toyota.'" When Ms. 
Berry sold the most beer, she was blindfolded and taken out to 
the restaurant's parking lot, where she expected to be 
presented with her new car. Instead, when the blindfold was 
removed, she saw a toy Yoda doll (the Jedi Master from tho 
Star Wars movies). She quit and sued for breach of contract 
and fraud. Although the restaurant manager contended that 
the contest was an April Fools' Day joke, the corporate owner of 
the restaurant settled the case, agreeing to give Ms. Berry a 
new car ... 
A case in Texas, GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, .. has 
garnered considerable attention and been published in some 
caae books as an exemplar of the tort of intentional infliction of 
t•i Karlak, Bllpra note 16. 
•.t:t In the United States, there la The \Vorkpla.ce Bullying & Trauma lnatitut.e 
(formerly the Campaign Againat Workplace Bullyinc). See 1upro note 16. In the United 
Kingdom, there is a UK National Workplace Bullying Advice Line. S« Bully OnL!ne 
Webeite,al http://www.bullyonline.orlfworkbully/index.htm <laat visit.id Aug. I, 2003i 
,.., See Karlak. 1upro note 18. Envisionworb is such a company. Sn 
Enviaionworb Wehaite, at http:/www.envlaionworb.net Oa.sted visited Aurust 9, 
2003). 
,.. Asoocioted Press, Juq• Soys Woitnn Can Sw HOOlua in "Toy-Yoda" 
Ca•, S. FIA SUN.SU."111'El., Oct. 14, 2001, at 88. 
,. Stt. e.g., Bz·HOOl<rs Wait,..., Scttln Suit, TllE SrATE (Columbia. S.C.l, 
May 10, 2002, al. 9; Whal a HOOi, FIH. TIMBS, May 10, 2002, at P13 . 
.. 99S S.W.2d 605 (Te.t. 1999). 
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emotional distress."' The case involved a male supervisor who 
managed a small office. Three employees sued for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress because the supervisor engaged 
in frequent profanity-laced tirades,"' required employees to 
perform redundant janitorial chores, had employees stand 
before him for extended periods while he stared at them, and 
frequently threatened employees with termination.'" Perhaps 
most memorably, this "bull" of a supervisor would lower his 
head, straighten his arms by his sides and ball up his fists, and 
lunge at employees, stopping just short of making contact with 
their faces as he screamed at them.' .. 
The 'l'exas Supreme Court embraces a strong version of 
the employment-at-will doctrine, and in employment settings 
the court has been loath to recognize tort theories,"' including 
intentiona.I infliction of emotional distress."' Indeed, the court 
in GTE Southwest stated that because many aspects of 
managing a business are unpleasant for employees, Texas 
courts "have adopted a strict approach to intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claims arising in the workplace.""' But the 
conduct of the supervisor in this case was so severe and 
occurred so regularly that even the Texas Supreme Court 
concluded it should not be expected in the workplace or 
tolerated in a civilized society.'" 
2. Bully Busting: Inadequacy of Current Law 
There exist only two types of law that address 
harassment or abuse in the workplace. The first type is the 
harassment theories under Title VII and the other employment 
anti-discrimination laws. Tbe second type is tort law, primarily 
'" s ... e.g., DAN B . DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, T0R'1'S ANO C0Ml'l!N$A'l'ION: 
PERSOSALACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSlUlLlTY ''OR INJURY 498 (4" ed. 2001). 
1111 Tho .. F word" and the -MF word" apparently were t\vO of his favorites. 
When one employee asked him to .stop because it was offensive, he got in D·ont of her 
face and screamed, •1 will do and aay any damn thing I want.• GTE Southwell, 998 
S.W.2d at 613. 
'" Id. at 613·14. 
IPO Id. 
1111 Texas recognites a narrow version of the tort of wrongful discharg~ in 
violet.ion of public policy. See S.bine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 
1985); Johnson v. Del Mar Distributing Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
1111 Gergen, supra note 28, at 1702 (stating that aside from cases involving 
sexual harassment, employl?&.& rarely succeed on IlED claims). 
" ' GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at612. 
ilk Id. at 617. 
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the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Commentators have argued that the two types of law provide 
inadequate protection.'" 
Regarding harassment law, the limitation on coverage 
of abusive conduct in the workplace is obvious. One who cannot 
prove that abusive conduct is because of sex, or race, or some 
other protected characteristic cannot recover, no matter how 
bad the conduct. This limitation is even more severe than it 
appears at first blush. When harassment is because of a 
protected characteristic has been a much-litigated issue.'" The 
result has been that in many cases involving sexual conduct, 
the plaintiff cannot recover becauso a court reasons that the 
because-of-sex requirement is not satisfied. 
The Supreme Court addressed a because-of-sex issue in 
Oncale u. Sundow11er Of{slwre Seru11., Inc .... In that case, the 
Court held that a claim does not fail to satisfy the requirement 
simply because it is same-sex sexual harassment. The Court 
did note, however, that the requirement is harder to satisfy in 
such cases. 'fbo Court's opinion a.lso includes statements that 
appellate courts have relied upon to deny recovery in a number 
of subsequent sexual (and other) harassment cases. Rajecting 
the argument that it was transforming Title VII into "a general 
civility code for the American workplace."'" the Court stated 
that w[t)he critical issue ... is whether membe.rs of one sex are 
exposed to disadvanta.geous terms or conditions of employment 
to which members of the other sex are not exposed.M• 
AB for tort law, plaintiffs have prevailed on IIED claims 
in workplace settings in only a small percentage of cases."' 
Courts often dispose of the cases on summary judgment, 
'" Sn Infra Pen ll.8.2. 
,. Sn, 14 .. David S. Schwartz, \Vh•n I• Su s.co .... of Sur Tht Cau.oollon 
Probhm in Suual llaroument Law, 150 U. PA. L. REY. 1697 12002). 
'"' 623 U.S. 16 09981. 
"'Id. 1180. 
"' Id. (quoting Hanis v. ForkliJI. s,.., Inc., 510 U.S. 11, 25 (1993) (Glnaburg, 
J., concurring)). Profcuor David Schwart& crit.icir.c1 the Oneok decision for it.1 ~ection 
of the .. ,ex per .c" 8hort.cut to proving "because of sex." Schwartz, 11upra note 196, at 
1703, 1728-48. By thi• he means that •sexual conduct in the workplace is nlweyo, 
without. more, 'bocousc of sex."' Id. at 1705. 
mo PERRITT, supra note 115, at 265, 268·76; Regina Austin, Etnployer Abu11e, 
Worker Re1i1tanot, and the Tort TMory of l nltntional l n{Uction of Emotional Di1tre11, 
41 STAN. L. R£v. I, 6.S (1998); Gergen, 1upm note 28, at 1102 l"lle•pite the apparent 
openneu or the tort, inOiction claims by employ"" "'"'ly 1.-ed."); Ehttnntich, 1upra 
note 23. at 66-66; Sum.me.rs, supra note 24, ac. 74 (-Su.ha for intentional inlUction of 
emotional dialftu are aeldom sua:essful. "). 
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finding that the high threshold of "outrageous" conduct (so bad 
that civilized society should not tolerate it) is not met. The 
most successful type of IIED case typically involves sexual 
harassment.•• The most likely reason for courts' reluctance to 
permit recovery on IIED claims for workplace abuse is their 
concern that the tort theory will become a way to circumvent 
the employment-at-will doctrine, thus serving as a stealthy 
wrongful discharge claim.• 
Other tort theories, such as battery and false 
imprisonment,.. have applied to some cases of workplace 
abuse, but they do not apply to general abusive conduct."' In 
cases of sexual harassment, .. plaintiffs hove also successfully 
used the tort theory of invasion of privacy (intrusion upon 
seclusion branch).• In some cases involving abusive discharge, 
plaintiffs have also used the tort of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy, but most stat.es require identification 
of a definite public policy,"' as well as harm to society at large -
not just to the individual - that will follow from not imposing 
liability for the discharge ... 
Many commentators thus deem current law inadequate 
to protect against workplace bullying. Harassment theory 
under employment anti-discrimination law is too narrow in its 
"because of" requirement. As for tort law, plaintiffs 
infrequently prevail on IIED claims because one of its elements 
•
1 Gercen, •upro. no~ 28, at 1102·; Denni• P. Our'fy. lnt1ntion.ol lnflicti0tt of 
EmotionCJ-1. Di•tre11 and Employm1u1t at Will: Tht Co•e J\/Jain1t ·Tortifi.ca.tion• of Labor 
a11d Empkzyment Low, 74 B.U. L. RBV. 387, 404 (1994). SH, e.g., Hoffman·LaRocho, 
Inc. v. Z.ltwangor, 69 $.W.&l 634 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding that oexual haraaamont 
eonatituted outraieoua conduct and a!Ilrming $10 million judgn1ent for employee, 
including $8 million in axemplary damageo), review 11romtd, 2002 Tax. LEXIS 181 
(T•L Oct.. 31. 2002), 
,. S"-o ~ .... Aullin, 1upro note 200, at 9 (""l'be cowu are particula-rly wary or 
attempq to use (llEDJ to evade I.be rules sanctioning tho aummary d:it<Mrge or ai.wlll 
employMs."); Dulfy, '"""'now 201, at 396. 
- &. Ebrtnrtlcb, 1upro note 23, at 22 • 
... &.. •.g., Mlrallalr.bari v. Penolcoolte, 1561 S .E.2d 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) 
(dlamissing claim ror- ralte imprisonment). 
"" See. e.g., Phillipe v. Smalley Maintenance Serva., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 
19831; Ott alao Ma.kdlal, 111pra note 20, at 1006·07. 
* See 1upro not.ct 114--29 and accompanying t.er:t for a fuller discussion or 
thia tort theory. 
,.. Stt, e.g., Groen v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp, 798 (E .D. Pa. 1995~ Gardner v, 
Leomi& Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996). 
• Ser cues cited •upro note 207; PER.Rn'T, 1upro not.e US, at ch. 3; Parker, 
IJqH'U note 2.3, at 392-4()2, 
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is deemed virtually impossible to satisfy, a problem 
exacerbat.ed in the employment context. 
3. Bully Busting: Proposals 
Among academic commentators calling for legal 
responses to workplace abuse and harassment,"" one writes 
that "no one has attempted systematically to define when 
workplace humiliation should be actionable.~, .. Professor David 
Yamada and the Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute have 
been at the vanguard of efforts to fashion new statutory law to 
prohibit workplace bullying."' Indeed, the Institute reports that 
in 2003, California will become the first state in which the 
proposed legislation is introduced in the state legislature.m The 
proposed legislation, designed for enactment at the state or 
federal level, would create a cause of action called "intentional 
infliction of a hostile work environment."m Essentially, 
Professor Yamada uses tho elements of a hostile work 
environment harassment claim under Title VII,"' including the 
Ellerthl Faragher affirmative defense if the harassment docs 
not culminate in a "ta.ngible employment action.""' Thus, what 
• SH, ~ .... Yamad•, 1upro note 16~ Pi1k1 1upro note 18: Ehrenretch, 1upra 
not.e 23; Austin, 1upra note 200. 
'I•• Fist, IUprG 00&.e 16, Al 73., 
, .. S8 1upra DGUI 16. 
•n Stt The Worltpl ... Bul4'1nc It Trauma Institute Weboite, '""'° nOCAI 18. 
'" Yamada,'""'° note 18, al 624°28. 
'" Alt.hough eexual baraumenl 11w 5- the best known type or harN1meot 
Jaw, hoatile work environment claim• are rococnl&ed on an bases covered by Title vn, 
.. well H the ADEA and tho ADA 
•l• Ye.msda, 1upra note 16, o.l 624. Yamada defines tho statutory theory of 
int.ent.ional inflict.ion of it hostile work onvi.ronment Lhi1 way: 
Id. 
In order «> prove int.cutJonaJ jnfllctlon or a hostile work environment, the 
plaintiff must establish by n preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant employer, Ito ogont, or both, lntonUonally aubjected the plainUJTto 
ll hostUe work environment. A hoetHo work environment is one th.al ie 
deemed hostile by both tho plaintiff and by a reaaonable per•on In the 
plaintiff's situation. Emp1oyen a.re to bo held vicariously liable for hOILUe 
work environment& i.ntenUonaUy created by their agenta. 
'nlO prima (acie caUM of octlon oulllned Immediately above ~ employen 
atrictly liable for the abu•ive behavior or lheir employea. Th.is alone providee 
employen with a strong incentive to preve:nt workplace bullying. However, 
the law also ahould reward proecdve 111empt.1 to prevent bullying and to 
effectively address allegaliooa lhal bullying hH OC>CUITed. Aa:onlingly, under 
this proposed lepl ITameworlt, when an employer b sued for the acu of an 
8&"11 lhat allegedly cruted a hotlile work •nvironment, it shall be an 
affirmative defeme for the employer only if: 
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he advocates is "status-blind hostile work environment" 
legislation."' 
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich has offered a different 
approach to workplace harassment."' She argues for a 
pluralistic approach to harassment in which adjusted tort law 
theories, principally IIED, augment sexual harassment and 
other harassment theories under the anti-discrimination laws. 
Although the focus of her proposal is a fuller understanding 
and treatment of sexual harassment in the law, her proposal 
would also benefit those who suffer abuse but cannot recover 
under the anti-discrimination laws.'" 
Among the proposals for new law to address status-
neutral workplace harassment, those invoking new statutes 
are misguided. Harassment and abuse are concepts that are too 
amorphous to be prohibited by statute. Any statute would say, 
in effect, "Don't be mean." Although the principle is laudatory, 
this clearly is a misuse of legislation as a regulatory 
mechanism, as it would provide no guidance whatsoever. 
Moreover, since it would likely be so vague, the statute would 
not alter the case-by-case adjudication that takes place now 
under the common law protections. It would thus be ineffective 
and superfluous. By contrast, adjusting common law tort 
theories would fine-tune the law and harmonize it with societal 
needs on a case-by-case basis, as well as avoid adding 
unnecessary law to an already crowded legislative field. 
Ill. THE PATCHWORK OF EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Making the case for common law rather than legislative 
approaches to workplace problems requires an overview of the 
current state of labor and employment law in the United 
States, and a brief history of the development of that law. This 
section devotes considerable attention to the employment-at-
will doctrine because of its pervasiveness and centrality in U.S. 
{a) the employer exerciaed rea'Jonab1e care Lo prevent and cort'ect 
promptly any l\Ctionable behavior; and, 
(b) the plaintiff employee unrea•onably railed to take advantage of 
any preventive or cotteelive opportunities provided by the employer 
or to svoid ha.rm otherwise. 
Id. at527. 
""Id. at523. 
m Eh.ttnreich. 1uptu note 23. 
1t1 Id. at 61. 
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employmont law. Furthermore, the power and prerogative 
vested in employers under employmont at will have so skewed 
common law analysis by courts that it is not surprising that 
employee rights advocates have littlo confidence in the common 
law and instead favor employment legislation. Still, as this 
section explains, the history of American employment law 
provides good reasons to agitate for a reinvigorated common 
law of the workplace. 
A. Employment at Will 
The beginning point for assessing U.S. employment law 
is the employment-at-will doctrino.'" lt is the hallmark of labor 
and employment law in the United States, serving as the 
default rule,. in most states for over a century.•• The most oft;. 
quoted statement of the doctrine is that absent an agreement 
to the contrary, employers can fire employees for a good reason, 
a bad reason or no reason at alt.• Despite the dubious 
proposition that someone can do something for no reason at all, 
the now famous, or infamous, iteration of employment at will 
encapsulates the absolute powor of omployers to govern the 
workplace. Although employment at will oxpressly addresses 
employers' absolute right to terminate employees, it is about 
much more. One who has the power to terminate also has the 
power to do as she pleases with respect to all terms and 
conditions of employment ... At its core, employment at will is 
about employer power and prerogative ... 
nt Sun11ncrM, 1111pra note 24, at 66 ("To underatand the Am.,ric11n t1y11t.e1n, 
therefore, it i.!I noc(!iQary t.o understand Lho doctrine of employment nt will, ill 
fundamc.nt.o.1 •uumptions. and it& ambivalenc;e. Mort1 importantly. it ie nece11ary to 
recognize where that fundament-1 asaumption ha11haped our labor law.•). 
"'" Stt, <4 .. C- R. Suru;tein, Swit<hin.<t the IA(oult Rule, 77 N.Y.U. I... RllV. 
106(2002). 
•• ProfMIOr And·~ Morri.&s hu atudied the timing of 5t8.t.es' adopUon of 
employ~l AL w;JJ. Andrew Moniu, Erplod1n1 M,tM: An Empirical ond &onomk 
~smeni of th• Ri .. of Emp/eyment AJ.Wil/, 69 MO. I... REV. 679, 681-82 (1994). In 
1851 Ma.ina waa the nm state to adopt the rule throua:h common law. By 1908, mott 
atatee bad udoptod it by ca"e law. Id . There ia an exten1ive body oflite:ratute rogardina 
th~ origin.a or employment at will and r~a$0nlf for tho propagat.ion and perpctuo&ion or 
the doctrine. St~ 1e'1eroUy Summers, 1upra noto 24. uL 66-68: Parker, •upro not.a 23. at 
349-52. 
"' Stt Payne v. Western & Alt R.R., 8 1 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) ("All may 
diami.aa t.heir 1mployefe)1 at will, be they many or few, for good caUJe, for no cauee or 
even for cauae moralt,y wrong, without being thereby ru.Hty or Jegal wrong."), owrrul«I 
on othu '""'"""· Hutton v. Watters, 179 S. W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). 
m Stt Cynthia I... &tlund, Wrongfil/ Di«horge l'rot«t:iC#IS in on Al·Will 
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The United States, the largest economy in the world, is 
a maverick among industrialized nations in clinging to 
employment at will.'" The member nations of the European 
Union, for example, have substantially more employment 
protection law than the United States."' Other nations with 
more protective labor Jaws look wistfully at the productive 
economy and low unemployment of the United States, but they 
disparage our limited legal regulation of the workplace and 
comparatively slight protection of employee rights ... 
Employment at will is often credited with creating the 
IVorld, 74 TEX. L. Rl1V. 1655, 1657 (1996) t"Tbe 1urroundinc •t·wlll repme afTetll not 
only Ille a~rmath or an n.rauably wrongl'ul dl1chargo and the availability or a remody: 
it allo aJl'ot11 employee condue\ and dynamit1 at tht wotkplaot."): Summers, 1upro 
note 24, at 65 1•111 ttntadot retch Into IMminily remote are.u or labor law, ror at ill 
f'Oolt la a rW>damtnUI loial &11umptioo rocanlins lite rtlatlont bttWMO an emplonr 
and ill employoe9. "). Cf. Mark A. Rothtttio, Wf'Oll6ftJ/ R1(1uol to Hire AJ1«1ti111 tloc 
Other Halfo(tloc EmpJoyment·at-Wlll Rul<, 24 CoNN. L. RllV. 97, 98 (1991) rm1 hu 
become aaeoclated with the more senora! principle that, abtont a 1u1u11 to tbt 
contrary. an employer h•• the riaht to hire or fire any perwon for any rea1on.i. 
114 Summer1, 1uprn note 24, at 66 ("'nle law, by ,tvlnr total dominance to the 
employer, endow• the employer wllh the divine right to rule the working 1ive1 or Ito 
autUcct cmployeOI."). Cf, Au11in, 111pro note 200, at 8·12 (d~cu .. ing Lho wide latitude 
court.a give employer• t.o u1e 1bu1lva authority lO direct 01nployce.' activities) . 
.. Su,,.,,, Summan, '"P'° note 24, ftt 65 ('The United St..t.ea, unlike elmoat 
every othtr indu1trlall&Od oouniry and many developlns countriu, baa neither adopted 
thro\llh the common law or by 1t.atuta • ,e.nera1 protectJon 1.pln1t unfair di1miu1I or 
d~ withoutjuat <&uae, nor evoo "DY period or notice."); Donald c. Dowllnc, Jr., 
Tiie Prodltt of l nt.,.natlanal Labor 4 EmpJoytrunt Law: El<Orf Your 
Labor/EmpJoyment Cli1nl4 into the Global Mill•nnlum, 17 LAL l..\W. 1, 13 (2001) 
(•American bUJineuee &N at.Hped in their unique and P«Ul1ar employmeni..at--wUI 
doctrine, which even other An1lo-1y•l<m countrleo like Ensland, Canada, and 
Au1tralia rejected yearo •AO."~ Unaurprl•ingly, The Unit.id Stn1<1 hao not rotified tho 
convention of the lnt.ernatJonal Labour Orga.nlzatlon on Tenninallon or Employment, 
which provides that "emp1oymonL of o worker aha.II not bo torniinated unless there ia a 
valid reason ror such tcnninu.tion connected wlt.h tho capacity <Jr conduct. of the worker 
or based on the operational requirements of t..he undertaking, e1-tablishment., or 
service." lntemat.ional Labor 01"(anizat.ion, Termination or Employment Convention, 
June 22, 1982, avoilabt. at http://www.ilo.org. The convention hu been "'tified by 82 
countries. 
,. Kohler, '""'° note 82, at 103-04 ("Aa ia gen•rally known, th<> Uniu.d Statft 
hiltorically bu provided comparatively meager formal lecal prottctiool or lite 
employment rel•tion.thip. Foreign obeerven typically characterize us u a 'hire and 
fire' eociety . .. . "). 
"' s .. Rocer Blanpain, Employm<nt and Labour Law: The European Uniqn, 
in CoMPARATIVE LABOUR AND IM>USTRIAL RELATIONS lN INOUSTRIAWEO !dARKET 
EcONOMJES 129 (Roger Blanpain, et al. eds., e• ed. 1998). Prime Minister Tony Blair of 
the United Kingdom ha11 championed the notion or a "'third we.y; between the 
deregulation, low labor 1t.andard1, and low unemployment of the United States and the 
United Kingdom on the one hand, and the heavy regulation, high labor standarda, and 
high unemployme.nt of the European natio.ns. Stt. e.g. , Roundlo.bl.e Di«ussion: What 
th• &perWicu of IM Rcctnt Patt Tt.U U• About tlll Labor and Employmont Law of tM 
Futwe. 76 L~'D. L. J . 177, 183 (200ll loommenta or Profouor Catherine Barnard of 
Trinity College, Cuibridge Univenity~ 
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flexibility in the United States labor market, although that 
proposition is dubious."' 
B. Emplc>yment Law Expansion by Legislation and 
Common Law 
Despite its notoriety, employment at will does not, of 
course, reign unchecked in the United States. The current 
landscape of labor and employment law in the United States is 
a patchwork of federal legislation and related case law, as well 
as state legislation and common law tort and contract theories. 
At the federal level, the Wagner Act (NLRA) was enacted in 
1935."' The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) followed in 
1938.... The FLSA represented a different approach to legal 
regulation of the workplace than that of the NLRA. The NLRA 
sought to invest the weaker party, workers, with more power 80 
that they could decide what they wanted from the employer, 
make their demands known, and obtain whatever their 
collective power enabled them to obtain. Section 7, the heart of 
the Act, recognized the following general rights of employees: 
self-organizing; forming, J01mng, or assisting labor 
organizations; bargaining collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing; engaging in concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection; and the right to abstain from the foregoing 
activities.•• Everything that was legal was on the table under 
the NLRA - workers could try to obtain whatever they 
wanted."' Other than the broad § 7 rights, the NLRA made 
,. John T. AddiJJOn. The U.S. En1ployrn~111 Afirocle in Comparative 
P1rsJJ«tivc, 19 CO•IP. LAB. L. & POL 'Y J. 283, 291(1998); Kohler, 1upro nOC.O 32, 1t 106 
(1tatinc t.hlJ commonly held belief, but quo1t.lonJnc iL). 
• Pub. t. No. 74-198, 49 &al. 449 (mdllied ••amended at 29 U.S .C. ti 161· 
58 (2000)). 
- Pub. t. No. 75-718, 52 StaL 1060 (1938) (a>difled u emended ll 29 U.S.C. 
H 201-219 (2000)) • 
... 29 u.s.c. f l 57 (2000). 
w Set Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Antl·Unkm Federal Employment Policy, 24 
HARV. J .L. & Pun. POLC'Y 489, 490 (2001) (dMCrlblng the NLRA •• •con•litutlve; 
establishing a Cto1ncwork for employees to obtain ror them3elve• what the employment 
laws provide by dlroct intervention). Senator \Vngner'• legislative ualst.anL a.nd the 
principal draftomen of the statute, Leon Keyaorlinr, 10id, -1r1t was our view that the 
greatest contributJon to greater equity a11d the dlttribution of the product between 
wages end prolil would come, not through tbe definition of terms by government. but 
by the proc81 of mll..,.ive ba.rgaininf with l1bor placed in • position nearer to 
equality.• Kenneth M.. Casebeer, Holdu of IM Pwn: An lntuv~lD with 1AOn X,,,Ml'li"ll 
on Dra/ling IM WQttur Act, 42 U. MLUIJ L. RJ!V. 286, 297 (1987). 
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nothing an inalienable right of the workers. In contrast, the 
FLSA declared a minimum wage, a maximum number of hours 
before overtime was due, and minimum ages for engaging in 
work and for certain types of work. Thus, unlike the NLRA, the 
FLSA established minimum rights, mandated by Congress, 
which cannot be altered through bargaining between employer 
and employee. 
In 1960 there were only two generally applicable federal 
labor acts. Beginning in 1963, a plethora of federal employment 
laws were enacted,"' from the Equal Pay Act in 1963 to the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993. Since then the 
expansion bas stopped at tho federal level. There have been 
numerous bills introduced in Congress, but none enacted. Still, 
the period of 1963-1993 witnessed a proliferation of federal 
employment legislation - at least compared with the history of 
labor and employment law in this nation before the 1960s."' 
States also have been very active in the last four 
decades in creating employment law, both by legislation and 
case law.• Some state statutes more or less track analogous 
federal statutes, such as state employment discrimination 
statutes,"' while others create rights not recognized by federal 
law. Among the types of employment laws enacted by state 
legislatures are workers' compensation acts, wage payment 
acts, covenant-not-to-compete laws, employment reference 
statutes, and a variety of other individual employment rights 
statutes. State courts have also recognized numerous contract 
and tort theories of recovery, including implied contracts, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
promissory estoppel, wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.'" Wrongful discharge in violation of public 
m See 111pra notes l -lts 11nd accompnnying text. 
* Sa. tt..g., George Nicolau, A Con1po.ri1on of Unlon and Non·Unio11 Empl.oyee 
ProtoctiOM in r,..t;,nd and I~ Unit«l Stou1, 14 N.Y. LNT'L L. REV. 33, 34 (2001) ('There 
bu been, in the United $'81 .. , over lh• last four dttad .. , what I have called 
elsewhere, the •Europeanization of the American workplace'-an overlay or protective 
legialation that is relatively new and which introducce prot.ecUona that largely did not 
mat before the 19601."). 
- Rothstein, •upro note 223; Koh~. •upro note 32, at 106-07; Micluoel D. 
Moberly &: Carolann E. Doran, TM NOH of IM Com<I: E:rtendi"I IM PublK: Policy 
Exc•ption Beyond the Wro1111ful Dischar11e Co1ue:rt , 13 LAB. LAw. 371 (1997), 
"' S.. Michael D. Moberly, Proc~dilllJ Oeometrioolly: &thinking Parallel 
Stal• and FedmJl Emplaymtnl Diacrimlnation LiligaJion, IS WHJrnBR L. REv. 499 
(1997). 
DT See. ~.g., Kohler, 1upra note 32, at 120-21. 
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policy is a tort created specifically for the employment setting, .. 
and it is the most recent tort to gain general acceptance 
throughout the nation.• 
It is fair to say that the hire-and-tire employment law 
regime of the United States has developed a considerable body 
of employment regulation since 1960."' Reasons commonly 
assigned for the high level of activity at both the state and 
federal level, through both legislation and case law 
development, are the concurrent precipitous decline in union 
representation in the 1960s through the 1990s'" and the 
emergence of an individual employee rights approach to 
regulating employment. Indeed, Congress has abandoned the 
collective rights regime of collective bargaining and 
wholeheartedly embraced the individual rights approach to 
regulating employmeot.w• Yet the law would not leave 
., ProfeHor M•.rk Oorgun dlslinlJUl•heo between wrongful dlochariC In 
vlolatlon of public policy on lhc one h"nd, and collateral tort&, such "'" defamation, 
lnvaaion of privacy, ond intantlonnl lnnlctlon or emotional dittreu on tho othtlr. 
Gergen, 1upro nole 28, •t 1693. The I.Ort of wrongful discharge in viololion of public 
policy acluolly con be trnc:cd to •• enrly •• 1959. s .. Kenneth A. Sprang, B1wort th1 
TOOlll/111 T;.,ir: A Critique of ll1r Afodtl Rruploy1nenr Tern1i11alion Act, 43 AM. U. I... 
Rav. 849, 866 (1994) (cilln11 Collfornlo CHO). h did not take hold, however, unlll tho 
publication of Profeuor Lawrence Bl•dt 't pothbreakin& article, EmplOJ1mrnt at Wtll "'· 
Individual Frttdom: On Llmlti1111 thr J\bu1iw EJ<erc/M of Emplo;ycr Powor, 67 COWM. 
L. Rav. 1404 11967). Profe11Mlt BladN actually arsued for a broader abuoive d'-charse 
tort than the current veniona ofwronsf\11 dlacharp in violation of public policy, but hJo 
article fueled the debata over tort law'• role In llmitlns tmployment at will. Id. 
• Sa, •-1 .. Bttiuiein, 1upro nOIAI 39, at 1647 lcallin1 W1'0t\Cful diadwp the 
""'"t p.._,joua of the four new 1u.-.llal ioru-the other three bein& IIED, invuloe of 
privacy, and product. liability). n,. Only (our Ital.el that do not recosnize tome version 
of wnmcful dioc.harge in violation of publlc policy are Alabama, Louisiana, New York, 
and GeoJ11ia. Even lhll l11tln1 It quNtlonoble becau1e Louiaiana has a otatut.e that 
ccdifiea &ome branche1 of the tort. LA. Rav. STAT. N<N. I 967 (2003). Montana doee not 
really reeog:rilie tho tor1, bul IL bu a aonor•I wronaful discharge 1tatut.e. MONT. 0001 
ANN. ff 39-2-901 lo 915 (2002). 
,.,. S«, e..g,. Kohler, eupra note 82, at. 104 ("'De1pite our renown for relatively 
abatC!mioua public intervention In workplnce reJaUonahlps and our gener'l preference 
(or private ordering, the previous tAln to flf\ccn years has been a period of unu1u1l 
legialatlvo and judicial aotlvlty."); Duffy, 111pro nooo 201, at 387-88 (discueeing the 
•rapid change'" in U.S. employment low), 
141 Union density in private 1ector employment. decrerased from about a t.b1rd 
of th& workforce at ite height in the mid to late 1950s to less than ten pen:ent by \he 
end of the century. UniM Mtmbtnt 0..:line to 16.3 Million a.t S"4tt of Employtd SllPI 
to IS.5 Parent, DAILY LAB. RllP. (BNA), Jon. 19, 2001 (No. 13), at 016. Kohler, 1upro 
note 32, at 104 (discussing docHnin1 union denaity u a reason for upe.n1.ioa or 
employment law); Paul-· Socio/ Chon111 and Judicial Rnpona: TM Hondboolr 
Es#pticn to Emp/oym«nt·M ·Will, 4 EMPLOYU RIGHTS & EMP. PoL'V J . 231, 234-35 
(2000) ("(UJnprecedented decline in \11\ion deoaity and influence at the end of the 1970. 
and beginning of the 19808 elfoctlvoly olimiuled collective barp.ining u a senuine 
ahemative to the at-will regime.->. 
"' James J . Brudney. &(llCtionl on Group Action and th< Low of the 
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employees unprotected; individual rights lawa began filling 
gaps when union representation and collective bargaining were 
not viable options, as was the case for most employees."' 
Historically, then, the American workplace has been 
regulated in several different ways,"' resulting in aome 
discernable divisions. Firlit, employment law can be 
implemented at either the federal or state love!. Second, it can 
be either statutory or common law. A third classification 
divides employment law into the c:ollectivo right.slbargaining 
approach of the NLRA, and the individual rights approach that 
has beon the regulation of choice during tho lost fifty years.'" 
The individual righta approach includes federal and state 
statutes, as well as at.ate contract and tort theories of recovery. 
Within the individual right.a statutes, a further division 
exists. There are minimum rights statue.es that prohibit or 
mandate specific acliona by employers, and those that do not. 
For example, tho FLSA requires employers to pay a minimum 
wage and overtime pay, and it restricts child labor. Likewise, 
the FMLA mandac.es that employers grant employees up to 
twelve weeks of leave for certain family and medical purposes. 
Other examples include tho WARN Act, which requires 
employers to give sixty days notice of a plant closing or mass 
layoff, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 
which prohibits employers from requiring employees to take 
polygraph examinations, or from taking adverse employment 
actions based on the results, except under certain 
circumstances. 
Wor4p/act, 74 TllX. I.. Rt.V. 11183, 1671 (1996) ("At oomt point during thla l•sl•lative 
b•rrs.1e. lt l>Kama clenr thRt Oor1grel!1 vlawftd governmt'lnt l'CJfJ\llAtioo founded 01\ 
lndividual employment richt., nlher than collective ~rt1inlnc betw ... n priv1t1 
eatili<ll. u lhe prinwuy m«lwlism (Or onlmnr emplo)'IMnl nlelble and 
rtdieuibutinr - 1c - "); Re\>el B. Sdlilw, ,.,_ Group R<ihu 1o 
I~ ubtnift: l'oot·WGT Labor z...,, Ldvo/U..., and IM W<IJl"'I of Un-
~A. 20 Bnx:zuv J !:MP. • LAL L. 1, 73 (1999) C"S1- lhe t960o, lhe labor 
mov•IMllt bu 1ull'ered l'rom American Ubenlitm'1 ~Ion or the croup bull ol' ito 
own put and le. inebility to ftnd a p!Aee r ... croup ri&:ht1 wlthln lht .-let ol'lndlvldual 
ri&:hto It dlnp to oo dMrly "). 
"' s..m.-n, •UJKO note 35, It 10 (-n,,, OOOMqllO- ii "'-eble, I( -
lnevitlblr. ii' coll•••i.., ~raalnln1 cloM not pl'Ol«l the Individual omplO)'t!e, the l1w 
will find 1nothor way to prol«t the w•altu petty.") . 
.... Pro(e111or Kenneth Dau&hmldt. dit1cueae1 the 1\r.nath• and WflAknMl8 or 
(our different methode u1td to 1ddre11 the l•&•l prote<:tlon or workero: lndivlduol 
baipinlng. col!K<iva ~rplnlll(, lesielative ....,J1tiOC1, and developmo11t or the 
_,_law. Oau..$clunkh. ••JNO DOit 23, 1t 686 • 
.. $«, q ., Kalhorine Van Woul SLOM, 7"' Lqoq of lnd..uia/ Plurolum: 
n.. Tr- &tuwn lndw rdWJ/ Bmp/,opMnt Ri6AU Giid tlw N<VJ lJwJJ Cdl«livr 
&rrainu11Syot.,,.,59 U. Clil. L. RIN. 675 (1992~ 
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Those minimum rights statutes stand in contrast to the 
anti-discrimination statutes. Although anti-discrimination laws 
are a type of individual rights law and are usually classified as 
minimum rights statutes, they differ from the foregoing 
minimum rights laws in an important way. The FL.SA, FMLA, 
and other laws of that minimum-rights ilk require or prohibit 
employer action, without addressing employers' motivation 
(with the exception of the anti-retaliation provisions). In other 
words, an employer paying below minimum wage or denying 
the FMLA leave provisions violates the statute regardless of 
the reason for the action. In contrast, the anti-discrimination 
statutes do not prohibit employment actions unless they are 
taken because of the employee's race, sex, disability, etc.'" They 
prohibit employment actions motivated by bad reasons. 
The history of employment law in the United States 
reveals different regulatory approaches to various issues at 
various times. In the early part of the twentieth century, the 
collective rights model prevailed th rough federal legislation. 
The 1960s witnessed the beginning of the individual rights 
regime, again through federal legislation. In turn, from the 
1970s through the end of the century, the states created 
individual employment rights through statutes and case Jaw. 
This evolution stemmed from the recognition that the one-size-
fits-all approach of the NLRA did not work. The changing 
landscape of employment in the United States required new 
and different law at different times. In light of this diverse 
history, one should not expect a single approach to work in the 
next century.'" 
C. Regulating Firing and Other Terms and Conditions of 
Employment 
Much of the reform and debate in employment law 
during the latter part of the twentieth century was about 
limiting employment at will by recognizing different types of 
wrongful discharge law, including the employment 
discrimination statutes."' Although Title VII covers all types of 
Ull See, e.g .• Kim, 3upro note 20, at 1517. 
t.d Cf. Summers, supra note 35, at 24 {f'I fear that becaus& of the wide variety 
of right.a to be protected and our hesitant legal recognition of them, the solution must 
be piecemcaJ and will inevitably be incomplete."). 
1411 See EstJund, supra note 223 (discussing the evolution and state of wrongful 
discharge law); Parker, supra note 23 (discussing common law and legislative 
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adverse employment actions, and at its inception was viewed 
more as a means of addressing discriminatory refusals to hire, 
most Title VII cases in the last twenty years or so have been 
termination cases.'" Harassment law under Title VII is the 
most significant departure from a focus on wrongful discharge 
under the employment discrimination statutes. Of course, 
there have been laws that regulate terms and conditions of 
employment other than discharge, such as the FLSA , the 
FMLA, the Equal Pay Act (EPA), and tl1e WARN Act at the 
federal level, and workers' compensation and wage payment 
statutes at the state level. Still, it is fair to say that the major 
battle of the latter half of the twentieth century was largely 
about employment at will and wrongful discharge. 
Only one state in the nation bas legislatively abrogated 
employment at will, and no other state is poised to do so. 
Moreover, statutory modifications of the at-will doctrine have 
not so clearly favored employees claiming wrongful discharge."" 
ln 1996, Arizona enacted the euphemistically named Arizona 
Employment Protection Act, which consolidated the legal 
tlleories that could be pursued in termination cases.'" The 
Arizona Act was passed in reaction to a pro-employee decision 
of the state supreme court, and most have understood it to be a 
pro-employer effort to curtail tort and contract theories of 
recovery."' Under the Arizona Act, employees can sue under 
only the tlleories delineated therein, and tile courts do not have 
discretion to recognize other claims. Specifically, the Act 
restricts courts from expanding the tort of wrongful discllarge 
approach•• to employment at will). 
"' John J. Donohue Ill & Peter Seligmann, 7'he Changing Nature of 
Eniplqymcnl Discriminotion Liti1Jalion, 48 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015·16 (1991). 
2
'° Psrker, supra note 23, at 373 (.iworkers i.n other jurisdictions could 
probably expect the same pro-employer ca.at existing in the ~fontana legislation.•). 
'" ARIZ. REV. STAT. §41:1461 (1996). 
'lt.:I The act was intendOO. to stem the expansion of wrongful diacha_rge in 
violation of public policy tho Arizona legislature discerned in the Arizona Supreme 
Court's decision in Wagenseller v. Seottodale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) 
(en bane) (the famouA "lwloon Rivet' case). See Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona. 
Employment Protection Act: A Return to the Employrnenl-·At· Will Doctrine, 39 ARIZ. L. 
Rev. 1139 (1997) (dMC:ribing the act as the "Legislature's response to the trend away 
from empJoyment·at.-wiU thot began in the mid·l.980s"); Jenny Clevenger, Comment 
and Legislative Review, Arizona*• Emptoy"1ent Protection Act: Drawing a Line in the 
Sand Betwttn tht! Court and the LegU!/aJure, 29 ARJZ. ST. L.J. 805 (1997) (•tating that 
the set '"effected dramatic changes ... halting, and, in some instances, reversing the 
expansion of employee rights in Arizona and severely limiting rooovcry in tort where 
those rights ar-e violated'"). 
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in violation of public policy beyond legislatively recognized 
policies. 
Even the heralded Montana Wrongful Discharge from 
Employment Act of 1987,"" which made Montana the only state 
in the nation to generally abrogate employment at will by 
prohibiting terminations without good cause, may not have 
been such a good result for employee plaintiffs. It, too, was a 
reaction by employers and insurers to the expansion of the 
common law theory of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, which had resulted in some large recoveries by 
plaintiffs.• • Because of limitations on remedies, the average 
size of jury awards has been substantially reduced, with the 
median award in one survey being zero."' The Model 
Employment Termination Act (META), promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
in 1991, has not been adopted, or even seriously considered, by 
any state to date. Further, employee rights advocates have not 
uniformly applauded it ... 
Employment at will has withstood the efforts by 
employment law reformers. While many contract and tort 
theories have been recognized since the 1970s, there has been 
retrenchment in the last decade or so, and employment at will 
is perhaps stronger now than it was twenty years ago."' 
Although one could predict in the 1980s and early 1990s that 
more states would follow Montana's lead in enacting wrongful 
discharge law, .. the resurgence of employment at will and the 
ebbing of contract and tort theories limiting the doctrine 
indicates that there will be no more state legislation enacted in 
the foreseeable future.... It cannot be surprising that 
... M ONT. CODE ANN. H 39-2-9011.0 914 (2002). 
.. 1-~arc Jartuli~. Proi«tins Work•r• From Wrongful Diacltarp: •tonio.110~1 
Expui<nce With Ton ond SJotuJory Rrgim••. 3 EMPLOYEE R'l's. & EMP. POL 'Y J . 106. 
107 (1999~ Parker, •upro note 23. at 371·73. 
- Jar1u1ic. 1upro note 254, et 122. 
"' SN Sprang. 1upro note 238. ot 86~; Parker. 1upra note 23. at 376·79. 
•t Sun1mcr1, •upra note 24, at 85 (•ITJhe trend in the last ten years hu been 
toward moro employer dominance."); Parker, M1Jpro note 23, at 350·51 (di1cu1sln1 the 
scrutiny of c1nploymont al will during thu l070t nnd '80t:, but concJuding that courts 
have not dove.loped coherent tort and contract low rcrttrding the doctrine); Kim, 1upra 
note 17, ut 680 (11Dospite the many calls for reform, the at-will rule ha1J retained ita 
vitality and, i( •nything. has been regaining strength in recent years."), 
"' Alan 8. Krueger. TM Euolution of U1vu1J-Di1miasol Lqi1lo1ion in tM 
Unired 5101 ... « lNDUS. & LAB. Ru. Rsv. 644, 658 (1991). 
"' Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, EmplOJ'm•nt in tit• N•w ~ of Trude ond 
TeclurcUJc: Implication• for Labor and Emplqym<nt Low, 76 IND. W. 1, 36 (2001~ 
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employment at will has proven so resilient. For employers, 
there is no more sacrosanct principle of law. Employers wish to 
operate their businesses as they choose with no regulation by 
federal or state government. Employment at will is the 
embodiment of no regulation; legislatures do not pass laws to 
regulate and court.a do not second-guess employers' termination 
decisions.• 
The tempest over wrongful discharge is not likely to 
abate completely in this century, but there is a noticeable shlft 
toward debate about reforming the law and increasing the 
protections regarding other terms and conditions of 
employment. One reason for this shift is the intransigence of 
the at-will doctrine. Another reason is that workers are less 
conce.rned with termination because job tenure is short, 
currently three and a half years on average.•• If employees do 
not stay in jobs long, job security and employment at will may 
be of less concern than making the workplace a pleasant, or at 
least tolerable, environment while they are there."' 
Ultimately, the failed efforts to statutorily abrogate 
employment at will hold three broad lessons for those who seek 
to reform the law regarding electronic and genetic privacy 
invasions, bullying, and other existing and future workplace 
problems. First, employers do not li.ke to be regulated, and they 
will oppose employment law, particularly legislation, which 
provides a concrete target when it is introduced in a 
Parker, 1upro note 23, at 40<I C"[Llea11lotive remedieo offer little real hope or 1uca11."). 
"" Ono judge •n•logi•cd tho hand1-ofl' opproach or courts lo at.will 
te.nnination1 to the court.a' no.-faolt "l>proacb to divorce.a: "Our law chooaea not to 
involve ii.elf with the unfair ..id 1ubjective treatmtnl leading lo tl>Me broken at-will 
ttlationah.ia» in a manner which ii 10mt1what analopua to no-fault divortt.• NieholN 
v , Allstate ln1. Co., 799 So. 2d 830, 860 (La. Ct. App. 1999) CC....away, J ., di1M!nlln1J, 
rru'd, 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000). 
'" BLS Report.1 Lil/It Change /11 Job Ten11ro Sintt 1983; Oop &tween So:e1 
Narrow/111, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNAl, Aus. 30, 2000 (No. 169), at DI (ttportinr Bureau 
of Labor &andanls aurvty lhat found median Unure of workera with their current 
employer i• 3\i yeart~ Henry S. Farber, TreN:/1 ;. Long Term Bmp/oyment "' t~ 
Uniled Sto~1 1976·96, In GLOBAL COMPl:l'ITION Al'IO THE A>ll!RICAN El!Pi.OYMEN'l' 
l.ANDSCA.PE: AS WE ENTER '!'HE 21" CENTURY, Pl!OCEEDINOS Ot' NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
620 ANNUAL CoNFERENCI ON LABOR 63, 89 (Samuel E1treicher ed., 2000) (lhe "fraction 
of worl<or1 who were in long-term employment relationahipa doclincd aignifieanlly 
between 1979 and 1996, with a di1proportionate 1hatt or the d<lc:line -·· .mce 
1993") ()lerelnafter GLOBAL COMPE'!TMON). 
'.ltn Prores15or Dau-Schmidt explains: "Juat-a.uae protection ia critica_1 only 
when the incumbent. job 11 clearly better for the worker than otbar jobs. A worker 
aulTen 1 ... damage from being terminated from a particular job that., with hlirh 
turnover, he probably would have left In a few yean anyway.• Dau-Schmidt., 1upro note 
259,at36. 
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legislature. Second, employers will ferociously oppose any law 
that appears to weaken employment at will."' Third, the 
Montana experience demonstrates an exception to the 
foregoing principles. If the common law has moved in a 
direction unfavorable to employers so that employment at will 
no longer provides reliable immunity in the courts, then 
employers may support legislation if they can fashion laws that 
restore them to a more favorable situation."' 
IV. RESERVATIONS A.BOUT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO 
EMERGING WORKPLACE PROBLEMS 
As the noted scholar Clyde Summers once remarked, Congress, in 
enacting legislation, does "not move by s mall s teps but rather by 
sporadic leaps.• Those leaps, some might be tempted to add, have not 
always been preceded by n careful look. Assuming we have reached 
one of thoee notable legislative momenta in employment ordering, 
how far and in which direction Congress might be inclined to vault is 
unclear.• 
As discussed above, a legislative approach is only one of 
the methods used to regulate employment in the United 
States,"" and only one of the approaches to guaranteeing 
individual employment rights. Many employee rights advocates 
have become perhaps too enamored of federal or state 
legislation as the best means of regulating employers' conduct 
and protecting employees' rights.•• As the analysis in this 
''ll
1 I am not revealing a great Jnyst.ery here. Employee rights advocates who 
are proposing reforms that can be mode without gut.ting employment at will, and who 
can restrain themselves from railing sgoinst it, know that. the. beftt. chance for their 
proposed law is to walk gingerly around employment. at. will. See, e.g., Yamada, supra 
note 16, at 531 (arguing that. the proposed status-blind haraumant. law does not 
aubst.antially impinge upon employment at will - certainly not as much as Title V11 
does). 
* Profeuor Alan Krueger ha$ examined the 1-fontana experience and nine 
other states in which just caus.o legislation was introduced in the legislature, only to 
fail. Krueger, supra note 258. Profeasor Krueger concludes that. leghilat.ion to abrogate 
empJoyment at will is more likely to be introduced when courts have aignificantly 
eroded employment at will through common law theories. Id. at 658; Parker, aupra 
note 23, at 373. 
,. Kohler, •upra note 32, at 119 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, A Summary 
Eualuation of the Ta/1-Harlky Act, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 405, 405 (1958)). 
2
• See supra notes 244-4 7 and accompanying text. 
w Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, al 698 (noting the current preference for 
legislative regulation); Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 32 n.128 ("'In part. the preference 
for Title VII (rather than torts to addre$.9 harassment claims) may reflect a scholarly 
bias in favor of federal law.-); Kim, supra. note 20, at 1500-01 (discussing the desire of 
advocates of genetic discrimination lagi.slation to claim the moral authorily of th" civil 
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section shows, legislation is not the best approach to regulating 
electronic privacy invaders, genetic discriminators, and bullies. 
A Politicai Limitations of a Legislative Approach 
Employers claim t.hey are besieged by legal regulations 
and potential liability.• From their perspective, the vaunted 
employment-at-will doctrine is a mere shadow of its former 
self, so riddled with exceptions that it cannot be relied upon 
any longer.• Although this may sound laughable to students of 
the law who recognize that the common law incursions of the 
1970s and 1980s have receded, employers in their operations 
may take note of tho potontial for liability ond act as though 
the legal realm outside employment at will is larger than il 
actually is .... Moreover, the changing character of the economy 
exacerbates this view. If U.S. businesses are to remain 
competitive in a market of global competition,'" they cannot be 
shackled with more and more employment regulatory laws that 
impose inc.reasing costs."' Thus, legislation may become even 
more difficult to enact in the era of globalization."' 
risl•U mov•menl): .,_ Parkor, 1upro nol4 23, at 370 O•bellna wronaful diecharg• 
loeialotioo "'!he cleul .. .,..china of employment law"). 
- Set. ~-4 , 01.80.-.i, •.upro note 33. 
,. S.., q., Doborah A. B..Uam, Bmplopn<nl·Al·W11/ 1li« lmP<ndi"' 0.0111 of 
0 DoctriM, 37 Alf. Bus. L.J. 663, 118? (2000) <"mhe ........ or lht cwnnt tttDda in tho 
wtMafUI dilCha,.. .,.. .•. tuuett that employen ooon wlll no longer be ablo to 
terminate emplo,Yff9 for no c1uae or bftd cause. The future or employmenl·•t·will, lhfin, 
ii Lhnt iL ha1 no future."). Bllt •ee Dowllnf, 1upru note 22~. aL l3-l4 (-U.S. employment 
lawyers say thttt AmeriCR'• c 111ploymont at will hat erodod Away, but Lheir1 i1 a 
bl1t.orical, not on lnternationRI panpoc;t.ive. By compftrl101\ to ot.bcr count..ria1, 
employment at will 11 alive and well In the U.S .•.. ."I: E•tiond, 1upro now 223, at 
1669 (a~ thot the employment·at..will doctrine •undennlneo and distorU the 
operation of lwroncful dilc:hargo) law .. % id. et 1688 ("Tho •l'l\lmeol that wn>ngf'ul 
di.ocWuge law hu ovitoenlled employment at will is 1imply onntai.d. "). 
"' Cynthia L s.tlund, How w,..,,, Are Empl-• Aboul Tlwir fU8hl• ond 
Why Dea It MotMrl, 77 N.V.U. L. REY. 6, 16-17 (2002) (d-nbin1 viow of employment 
law in which tho "thadow ol'the law" b larger than the law~ 
"' S.. 0.u-&!imldt. 1upro note 23, at 697·98, 702 (ditcu.,ing this iNue at 
one or the limilatlon1 or the lofi1lative-regulation approach lo lepl\y protec:tlnc 
workert). 
m S.. Surt19 of Monufactu,..,... '°'""""' Co.11 of Complylfll With IVOl'*p/°" 
Rrzuln1ion1, DAILY LAB. REP. CBNAl, Jan. 24, 2002 (No. 16), It Al (detailing survey by 
George &iaaon Univaraity'1 MottatUI Center reprding COit.a or compliance with 
workplace lawt). 
m Stt Stewart J . Schwab, PredU:ling lh• Fulurw of EimpWy11Ulnl Law: 
Rt/ltclifll or ~{roding MarAd FOl'ttsl, 76 IND. L. J. 29, 3-4 (2001) ("More frequently 
will tho argumont be hoard ond accepted that a country unnot afford extravagant 
omploymeni..law ~ono whoo other countri.. are only providing el!'tclent 
~..,.. "); O.u&bmX!t, wpro nol4 23. at 697. 
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From federal and state legislators' perspective, 
employment legislation is a political lightning rod.'" Although a 
considerable number of federal employment statutes were 
passed from 1963 to 1993,"' major federal legislation has not 
been passed in the decade since. Of the proposed statutes on 
electronic monitoring and genetic discrimination, the only ones 
that have been enacted are genetic discrimination statutes at 
the state level. The electronic monitoring bills are the most 
revealing example of how hard it is to enact employment law. 
The PCWA and NEMA would have imposed modest regulations 
on electronic monitoring of employees,'" but they were bottled 
up in congressional committees by business groups. The 
California electronic monitoring notice bill was passed three 
consecutive years by the legislature and vetoed by the 
Democratic governor each time."' If such a meager limitation 
on monitoring cannot become law in California with a 
Democratic governor, it is hard to imagine where such a law 
could be enacted. In sum, taken together, the dearth of federal 
legislation in the past decade, the aggressiveness of the 
employer's lobby, and the California experience with electronic 
monitoring, illustrate that legislative responses to new 
workplace issues face substantial political hurdles. 
B. Limitations of Minimum Rights Legislation 
The proposed statutes also demonstrate the difficulty of 
addressing general status-blind harassment and invasions of 
privacy through legislation. The method does not fit well with 
the protections that employees need. The general harassment 
law is a minimum rights law that prohibits a type of 
employment action, as do the FLSA, the FMLA, the EPPA, and 
the WARN Act. The problem is that the law does not prohibit 
something with sufficient specificity to be effective. 
Harassment or bullying describes many acts and many 
degrees of abuse. The anti-bullying law proposed by Professor 
1"1~ &e Hill Watcher$ Fortstt Liule Acliuity on lhe Lo.bor and Employnient 
Law Front, DAILY LAB. REP. <BNA), Aug. 9, 2001 (No. 163l (quoting Deron Zeppelin, 
director of government affairs for the Society for Human Resourc& Management, a.a 
saying, .. A.fost members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote on 
[employment[ issue&, period."). 
m See supra notes 1.15 and aeco01panying text. 
r.. See supro. notes 150·58 and accompanying tex:L 
Yn See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying texL 
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Yamada and The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute is 
too vague to be useful - either in giving notice of prohibited 
conduct and deterring it, or in giving courts a standard for 
imposing liability."' To take sexual (and other Title VII) 
harassment theory and sever the "because of ... "element is to 
create a minimum terms statute with a vague standard: Do not 
be abusive or mea.n to employees. Minimum terms statutes, 
other than anti-discrimination statutes, work well when they 
state specific actions that employers are required to take (pay a 
minimum wage and overtime) or are prohjbited from taking 
(requesting or requiring a polygraph examination, except under 
certain circumstances). However, when the laws concern a 
general type of conduct, they work poorly. 
The electronic monitoring bills also are minimum rights 
laws, but they suffer from just the opposite problem of the anti-
bullying law. They are specific enough to be implemented but 
provide little protection for expectations of privacy. If Congress 
enacted a law that prohibited electronic monitoring, that would 
be a substantial privacy protection law. Congress did pass a 
similar law in another context in1988 - the EPPA, which 
essentially prohibited employers from using polygraph 
examinations."' However, because of the well-accepted 
interests of employers, neither Congress nor any state 
legislature will seriously consider a bill that prohibits 
electronic monitoring; indeed, there is no need to waste time 
considering such a law when even notice laws cannot be 
enacted.• Consequently, the bills are restricted to requiring 
notice, and they provide little protection of reasonable privacy 
interests of employees.'" In this respect, the PCWA and NEMA 
"' See Katherine V.W. St.on•, Tile New P1yehol1J11iooJ Contro<:t: Implkationo of 
tM C~ w.,.•place l'or Labor ond Emp/a;yment Law, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 519, 611 
(2.001) (deocribinc Yamada'• pro.-.J u having• atandard thaL ii t.oo vague to apply, 
and charademing iL u "providing broad new cooaptiono or workplace justice rather 
than detailed bl\leprinlt ror lesal rd>nn"l. It is no answer thal IL prohibits harassment 
m11<h u TiUe VD prohibits IOI end otheT tltt..._buod ti. ..... menL Anti· 
dilCrimination 11tw fOCUlff on the motivation or cause or the ad.vene employment 
ection. Title Vfl doel not prohibit firing, hi.ring, OT hel'INiDJ unJetl it ii because O( a 
protected characteriatic. In the atetus-bHnd harassment propo1a.l, tM.re is no becauae-
of requirement. The difference renders the standsrd in the anti-bullying law too vague 
to be used. 
"' 29 u.s.c. H 2001-09 (2000>. 
"" Frayer, tupro note 19, ot 873-74 (argillng that a bill lhat protecta privacy 
interests sbou_ld not be considered now in view of failure of notice bill.a). 
2'l1 Stt. e.g., Kee.an, 1upra noi.e 19, at 300;. Wilborn~ 1upro note 19. at 851-62; 
Frayer, tupru note 19, at 869. 
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resemble other minimum rights laws that give employees 
little."' 
There is no quick fix for this flaw, making it all the 
more fatal. lt would be difficult to draft a statute that falls 
substantively between the notice laws and a prohibition on 
monitoring-one that balances the interests of employers in 
monitoring and the privacy interests of employees.• Balancing 
tests are performed in specific factual contexts, and a statute 
stating that specified interests must be balanced would not 
provide the certainty or predictability that are the principal 
objectives of legislation. In short, cose low still would develop 
the practically useful principles. 
Tho genetic discrimination statutes enacted by states 
and introduced as bills in Congress fit more neatly within the 
types of legislation that have been enacted in the past. Most 
take the form of anti-discrimination laws by prohibiting 
adverse actions because of a protected charact.eristic ... The 
laws also resemble minimum rights laws in that they impose 
limitations on employers' requiring or requesting that 
employees submit to genetic testing."' To the extent that the 
genetic discrimination laws are minimum rights laws, most 
legislatures are not willing to prohibit the testing altogether 
because there are some good reasons why some employers for 
some jobs under some conditions might need to require genetic 
testing.• By mixing a minimum rights approach with an anti-
discrimination approach, the laws manage to provide more 
protection than most minimum rights statutes. The resort to 
the anti-discrimination paradigm ls troubling, however, for 
other reasons. 
C. Concerns About Anti-discrimination Law 
The concerns in th.is section have little if any 
implication for electronic monitoring laws, but they are 
relevant to status-neutral harassment laws and genetic 
"' Summe.-., • upra note 24., at 84-86 (1tatlng that "Olabor legialatlon In the 
Unit@d States ls of\en half·hcarted.'' end aiving aa e:itamp1e!J several minimum ri(hte 
laws): St.one, oupra note 245, at 686·38 (dl•cuHing problems with "individual 
rights/minimum term& model of labor relation•"). 
"" Wilborn, •upra note 19, at 852·63, 876 . 
.. Feldman & Kati. •upm note 20, at 410·16 (surveying state lawo). 
- Id. 
- Td. at397. 
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discrimination laws. The proposed statue-blind harassment law 
is modeled on the harassment law that developed under the 
federal employment anti-discrimination laws."' Despite the 
success of past anti-discrimination laws, and probably because 
of that success, they are the subject of frequent criticisms. 
Because of the importance of these laws to our society, we 
should be very cautious about using the anti-discrimination 
model for addressing emerging workplace problems. Deploying 
tho method too often dilutes its potency. Instead, the method 
should be reserved for select instances of compelling public 
policy to protect discrete groups that historically have been 
discriminated against... By indiscriminately employing the 
model, the proposed status-blind harassment law and the 
proposed and enacted genetic discrimination laws could 
weaken the employment anti-discrimination laws, although 
that is by no means the intent of their proponents.• 
The employment anti-<iiecrimination statutes have been 
the most significant and most effective statutory labor Jaws 
since the NLRA. Title VII, in particular, has generated a 
monumental shift in employment law and society.'"' Anti· 
discrimination law significantly impinges upon employment at 
will, carving out a number of bad reasons, or "cause[s) morally 
wrong,"'" for which employers cannot take adverse employment 
• Stt 1upro notes 209-IS ond oooompanyini 1 .. t. 
• Stt, •-1. Kim. ••pro now 20, 11 1622-24 (-ldns that a "history of 
oywum1tic ditcrUninatlon," one of the moot 1onorally occepted ruaona Cor exiatin1 
ancl-di.criminotlon law, dOH not apply lo pnedc di.crimin1tion). 
The importAnce of the low1 ind the publlc polley on whleh they are 
founded haa not been more eloquently artlcu11ted thin lhla: 
The antl..emp)oyme.nt. di1crimintttion l•w1 ue 1uil\atod wi.t.h a pubHc •ure for 
n!A10n1 that are weU known ... Confl"C"ll ba1 re11pondftd to ... pernicious 
mJto0neept.ion1 and ignoble h•tred1 with humanlt.luian lawt fon:nulated to 
wipe out the iniquity of discrimination In 01nployment, not merely to 
roco1npense che individuals 80 harmed but principally to deter future 
viol at.ions. 
Tho anti*employment discrimination lawa Congre111 enacted consequently 
rNOnate with a forceful public policy viJifyinr diacrimination. 
Mnrdell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), ttrl. granted 
a11djudlm•nl uacated, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995). 
• Proreuor Yamada apeclfitally ~ea. Pror.-r Hapr'a UJUmeni. 
reprdinr ouual lwusment law. S.. infra note 303. Yamada UJU"" that "the 
•nactmfllt or. 1totu.-bllnd hoetile work environment law could 1pec:ially benefit~ 
who are la.rcet& of 1tatu.s-bued b.a.raument et well.· Yamada. 1upro note 16, at 529. 
• Cf. Kim, ••pro note 20, at 1524-25 (dlacuaoinr early successes ofTiUe VD-
•tft'ec:tu1tod • ehange in norms"- but recogni&inr that it hao lea impact now). 
•• S... e.g., P.,ne v. W. & All R.R., SI Tenn. 607, 520 (1884i 
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actions. Indeed, today the federal and state anti-discrimination 
statutes and the case law developed under them stand as the 
only significant counterweight to employment at will.'" Overall, 
employment anti-discrimination law has drastically changed 
workplaces, employment law, and society in the United States. 
Notwithstanding the change wrought by the anti-
discrimination laws, it is a precarious success. The biggest 
success story is also the biggest and most attractive target."" 
There is significant debate, beginning in 1964 when Title VII 
was enacted and continuing to this day, about the animating 
theory of the employment anti-discrimination laws. One theory, 
and the one most often articulated, is the formal equality or 
status-neutral theory, which posits that the purpose of the laws 
is to eliminate race, color, sex, etc., from employment 
decisions.'" The other theory, the antisubordination or 
"protected-class" theory, holds that in order to achieve equal 
opportunity in employment, the anti-discrimination laws must 
eliminate barriers erected to impede groups that historically 
have been discriminated against."' 
Under the protected-class theory, the heart of protection 
encompasses groups of people who have historically been 
denied employment opportunities and otherwise discriminated 
against. Under the formal equality theory, no group, regardless 
of historical discrimination, is accorded different treatment. 
Courts have articulated both theories."" Although the rhetoric 
1111 One court rOOOb"llized this when it atated that '"di.scriminotion is much 
more than public policy in Ohio, it ia eloarly in and of itaelr D,n except.ion t.o any ot.-will 
employment agreement."' \Voods v. Phoenix Society of Cuyahoga County, No. CV. 
370763, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 2100, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (quoting White v. Fed. 
Ra•ervo Bank, 660 N.E.2d 493 (1995)). 
'" See, e.g., EPSTf:ffN, supra not~ 33; OLSON, supra note 33. 
"" Schwart._ s11pro note 196, a t 1775-76; David S. Schwartz, Tile Case of the 
Vanishing Protected Cl.ass: Re/1ectie>ns on Reuene Discrimina.tion~ A{firnulliue Actiotr~ 
arid Rocio/ Balancing, 2000 WJS. L. REV. 657 [hereiJlat\er Sc:hwartz, The Case of the 
Va.nit1hiJig Protected Class) . Thht theory ia c1ose1y aligned with, if not synonymous with, 
the perpetrator perspectiv0 on discrimination. See Alan David Freeman, Legit.i1t1i~ing 
Racial Disc,rimination Through Antidiscrirnination Latu: A CriJical RevielU of Supre-rne 
Court Doctrine, 62 MlNN. L . REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978). 
"' See, e.g., McDonnell Douglo• Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); 
Schwartz, supra note 100, at 1776 (discussing the antisubordination or protectedMclas.s 
theory of the anti-discrimination laws); Schwartz., The Case of the Vanishing Prolected 
Claaa, supra note 294. This theory is closely aligned with, if not synonymous with, the 
victim perspective on discrimination. See Freeman, supra note 294, at 1052-S?. 
:ne Case law recognizing the legality of affirmative action under Title VII is 
the moat. dramatic example of the protectedMdass theory. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tran.sp. 
Agency, Santa Cloro County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Steelworkers v, Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979). A reoent. case exemplifying the statt1sMneut.ral theory is an age disc.rimination 
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of the formal equality theory predominates in the cases, the 
protected-class theory lives on in both rhetoric and substantive 
djscrimination law. The most prominent examples of anti· 
discrimination case law supported by one theory but 
antithetical to the other are the disparate impact theory of 
discrimination and affirmative action, which both draw from 
the protected-class theory."' 
Other examples exist in distinctions courts make in 
disparate treatment cases. For example, some courts have 
stated that for whlte plruntiffs to establish a prima facie case 
under the McDonru!ll Douglas proof structure, they must 
produce more evidence of discriminatory motive than African· 
American plaintiffs.• Courts in some cases have held that for 
male plaintiffs to establish a disparate impact clrum, they must 
produce evidence of djscrimjnation that female plaintiffs are 
not requfred to produce.• Many proponents of the formal 
equality theory are hostile to the protected-group theory, 
arguing that it uses anti-discrimination law to discriminate ... 
There are two fundamental problems with the status-
blind harassment law proposal: it has a dangerous theoretical 
underpinrung, and it ventures into a most controversial subject 
area. Aa to the first point, status-blind harassment law is 
grounded on arguments made by proponents of the formal 
equality theory of employment anti-discrimination law, or 
perhaps more pointedly, opponents of the protected-class 
theory These arguments all rest on the idea that workplace 
abuse causes a digrutary harm for men as well as women, and 
the law must protect both equally.* This idea poses a threat to 
cue in which the court of appe:ala pcnnitted • ., ace dilCr'imination claim by younger 
plaintitra who claimed that the employer diecriminat.cd against them on the basis of 
_,.In favor of older employeea. Clin• v. Gen. Oynamlce Land Sya., Inc., 296 F.3d 466 
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. ci 1766 (2003). 
•
1 Schwartz, The Caae of JM Vani1hinf Pl'Olecltd Clau, aupra note 294, at 
662·63. 671-76. 
"" &... e.g .• Jadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 1999). 
1
• Stt, e.g., Livingaton v. Roadway Expreee, l nc., 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 
1986). SH geMrolly Donald T. Kramer, \VhaJ C0111litute1 Reuene or Majority Race or 
Nalh>nal Origin Di1eriminatioti V'wl.atiw of Ftdcral Conatitution or Stalutu - Priuo.te 
Emp/oym<nt Ca1t1, 150 A.L.R Fed. I, f2b (1998): - also Timothy K. Giordano, 
Comment, Diff<,...nl T,...tm<nl for Non·Minority Plaintiff• U!Uhr Titk VII: A Call for 
Modification of th• Badground Circumolancu THI to Eltuun That S.JKJrole la Equal, 
49 EMORY L.J. 993 C2000l. 
- S<hwaru, The C- of tho Vanuhi"lf Pro<t<t<d C/oa, •upro note 294, at 
668-70 
"' Marl< Mclaughlin Hager, H,,,,,_,., a. a Ton: Why Tith VII Homu 
Enuiron.rMnJ Ual>il~ Should & CIUUJil<d, 30 CONN. L. Rav. 375, 383 (1998). 
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the anti-discrimination laws because it labels all 
discrimination based on a protected characteristic as wrongful 
and seeks to equally apply the laws in the same way to all 
races, sexes and religions, regardless of historical 
discrimination. For example, no different principles of Title VII 
anti-discrimination law can apply to whites than African-
Americans; plaintiff-friendly presumptions that make sense 
when applied to African-Americans because of the history of 
employment discrimination must be applied to whites as well."' 
Professor Yamada is aware of this danger nested in his 
proposal, but awareness is no cure.'"' 
This danger is one of the reasons that Professor Rosa 
Ehrenreich proposed keeping the focus of Title VII on the 
discriminatory nature of sexual harassment and 
supplementing it with a modified tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress to address the dignitary harms."' I do not 
suggest that opponents of the protected-class theory would 
support status-blind harassment law; instead, they would 
argue that the only legitimate theory of discrimination, applied 
to harassment law, should lead to the untenable and infeasible 
result of law that prohibits employers from being mean or 
tolerating meanness in the workplace - the general civility 
code argument, already rejected. 
A second danger embedded in the status-blind 
harassment proposal is that it takes as its model the most 
controversial theory of anti-discrimination law - harassment.'"' 
The efforts of Professor Catherine McKinnon and others to 
establish the theory of sexual harassment under Title VII have 
been well documented.''" Not only could it be argued at the 
founding of the theory that it should have been left to tort 
law,'" but the argument has been made since the sexual 
harassment theory received the imprimatur of the Supreme 
.,, See, e.g., Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 824 F. Supp. 677 {S.D. Tex. 1993); see 
generally Kramer, supra note 299, §2b; Giordano, supro note 299. 
• Yamada, sitpro note 16, at 531 ("To say that the distinction between 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory harassment is morally untenable is to take a fair 
point- that haraurucot of nny kind is wrong- too far.") . 
.,. Ehrenreich, Sllpm note 23. at 63. 
806 See, e.g. , Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 445, 450 (1997); Ebrenreich, aupro note 23, at 7-8; Kohler, supr<> note 
32, at 116. 
3CJll See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supm note 23, at 32·36. 
"" Id. 
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Court."" As difficult as it is to explain the theoretical 
underpinnings of sexual harassment law,"" it does not help to 
create a status-neutral version. 
While adding status-neutral harassment law would not 
result in the repeal of federal anti-discrimination laws, it 
unwittingly narrows the theoretical basis of anti-
discrimination law and extends one of tho most vulnerable 
theories - harassment. Employment anti-discrimination law 
can be weakened in many ways without the statutes actually 
being repealed."' Status-neutral theory and prohibition of 
ambiguous conduct would make the law seem overly intrusive 
in the workplace and perhaps make it look frivolous or 
ridiculous. Opponents would thus argue that the law imposed a 
general civility code and sanitized tho workplace, not only 
attacking the status-neutral law in particular, but also by 
implication all anti -discrimination employment laws, thus 
potentially weakening the entire field. 
The genetic discrimination laws arc not pure anti· 
discrimination laws. ln the division between minimum rights 
statutes and anti-discrimination statutes discussed above, they 
should be classified in part as minimum rights laws, like the 
Employee Polygraph Protection Act."' For eXDmple, to the 
extent that the laws prohibit employers from requiring or 
requesting that employees submit to genetic test.ing, they are 
like the EPPA, a minimum rights statute. Most, however, are 
not just minimum rights laws because most of the statutes do 
not simply prohibit genetic testing. To the extent that they 
prohibit adverse employment actions based on information 
about genetic conditions, they are more like anti-discrimination 
laws."' There is nothing wrong with the laws being a cross 
• Hager. •upra note 301; EUen Frankel Paul, Sexual Jlaro..nunl o.t ~:r 
Oi«riminalion: A 0.-ft<Jtiue Poradilm, 8 YALE L. & PoL 'v Rxv. 333 (1990). 
• Stt. <.g •• Bomtteln. ••f"O note 305, at 446; Ehrcnniich, •upra note 23, at 
7-16. 
3
• Consider. for e.1.a.mple, the progres.sive narrowins or thfi diepante impact 
theory o( diKrimination under Title VIJ, culminating in \Varda Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). At least some or that narrowing 1ub1equontly wu 
reversed with the pRaaago of the Civil Right. A<t of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102·166, 105 
StaL 1071 (1991) (codified n• amended at 42 U.S.C. t 19810 (2000) and scattered 
1Cction1 of2 U.S.C., 16 U.S .C., 29 U.S .C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
111 See Kim, aupra note 20, pasaJ'nJ (arguing that pnclic discrim_ination doe11 
not fit the anti-discrimination par&digm and is better addttt.aed through privacy law). 
•lf At. first blu.ah, one could aay they are minimum right.a lav.•1 just like the 
EPPA, which also prohibito advorso employment actiono on lho buia of information 
obtained from pol.nniphs. Unlike lhe information obulned by polygraph testa, 
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between minimum rights laws and anti-discrimination laws. 
However, their anti-discrimination aspects are troublesome. 
Particularly troubling are their departure from prior anti-
discrimination law in protecting a discrete, historically 
discriminated-against group; their kinship with the Americans 
with Disabilities Act; and their potential redundancy."' 
First, unlike other anti-discrimination laws, the genetic 
discrimination laws do not grow from a history of 
discrimination against a particular group.'" Instead, they are 
more like tho proposed electronic monitoring laws- a reaction to 
advances in science and technology. The "genetically 
defective""' have now sped past other candidate groups, such as 
homosexuals and parents, to be protected by state employment 
anti-discrimination laws,"• and there is a chance that Congress 
will pass a genetic discrimination law before it passes a sexual 
orientation anti-discrimination law."' There is no requirement 
that a group of people who face discrimination in employment 
must line up and wait their turn for protective legislation, 
never breaking in line. Still, tho history of employment anti -
discrimination law in this nation reveals long periods of 
incubation for civil rights laws in which the record of historical 
discrimination is publicized, political alliances are forged, and 
howovv. the lnronnotlon obtained by genetic 1 ... 11n1 11 lnronruotion •boul a ponon'a 
inherent cliarad.eriatico. 
tu Profouor Kim diacunell IOmct of thOH reuDM and otbtti for her rejection 
or the anti4iKriminelion model for genetic dilCl'lmlnaUon. She aleo argum that. 10m1 
of the pracUCJJI difficulties with anti-diacrimirtadon h1w, auch u the proof 1tNctura1 
and doctrine. t.bot have made diBCriminotlon caac1 difficult to win and COJ1Uy to 
litigate, would be incorporntcd into genetic dl,.criminl\tion IRw. See Kim, 1upro noLll 20, 
at 1524-28. 
"' Sec, e.11 .. KJm, aupro note 20, at 1618·20; cf. Peggie R. Smith, Part11lal· 
Statu1J Employ1~ru Dl1crin1ino.tion.: A Wrong In Nud of a Risht, 35 U. MICH. J.L 
REFORM 669, 604-07 (20021. 
1 15 
"We're all mut.ant11 ... everybody i1 renedcally defective.• Brian l\,f. lrotL,, 
Common!., <hnttkoll:t 0.f«tive: Th• Judi<iol lnlt'Pn!lotW. of the Am•ritoM with 
Di.labilitin kt flail• 10 Proud Agoin•I <hnttlc Di«n"mi110tion in tltr Worllpl.oce, 35 J. 
MAPSH'U. I.. REY. 467, 457 (2002) (quoting Dr. Michael Kaback); Kim. ••pro note 20, 
al 1520 ("Even conceptualizing the relevant dil8dvantaged "group• raioet aome 
difficulties, given that. e.aeh individual's genetic n11t..erial contains some anom1Jie1 that 
predi•J)OOO lO dil6AIMl.0 ) . 
11
• There nre about 31 states that have paaed genetic di11criminalion Iowa. 
See NHGRJ Wobli!Al, Nllpra note 145. Only 11 •tates have sexual oriont.otion 
discrimination Iowa. A1Jchaol OeHkat., Dl#Crin1il1atlon Low Update, in LITIOATlNO 
EMPLOYldENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 2002, al 134 (Practicing Law Institute Litlg. 8t 
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series, No. HO-OOFC, 2002). 
•n Rqarding attempts since 1994 t.o peu tho Employment Nondiacrimination 
Art CENDAl concerning sexual orientation, ..,. •upra note 15. C<lngrell8 already hM 
am1ide~ a poetic diocrimination bill, althoush it hM not poased. Stt IU[NO ,,_ 
171-76 Md a-.npanying text. 
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eventually sufficient public policy support and political clout 
coalesce to provoke passage of the law.'" Unless one views the 
people protected by genetic discrimination laws as disabled 
individuals, who are protected by the ADA, then this 
incubation has not happened. Rather, the frightening prospect 
that science and technology could penetrate deep within our 
zone of privacy - into our genetic composition - has resulted in 
the passage at the state level and consideration at the federal 
level of new anti-discrimination law. 
The more deliberative and gradual process behind other 
anti-discrimination laws served two important purposes. First, 
it showed that the problems at issue were pervasive and that 
existing law was inadequate. It is not yet so clear that the 
problem of genetic discrimination is pervasive enough and that 
existing law is inadequate to address the problem."' One can 
think of other groups of people who are discriminated against 
in employment, including perhaps parents"" and the physically 
unattractive."' However, the existence of such employment 
discrimination will not prompt anti-discrimination law in the 
foreseeable future. Second, the slower process behind past anti-
discrimination legislation allowed time for political consensus 
to develop to give the laws the imprimatur of actual public 
policy, which is currently lacking within the context of genetic 
discrimination. Although problems of discrimination may exist, 
it does not necessarily follow that they should be addressed 
through federal employment anti-discrimination legislation."' 
1111 Cf. Smith, 111pra note 314, at 601· 12 (discussing factors that determine 
which classee become protecled under law, including immutable cbaractoriatics, 
history of discrimination, jot>.relatednesa of the characteri11tics, and J)Qlit.ica.1 power). 
1 111 See sources cited 111pra note 36 (arguing that existing law addre111:1es the 
problem to lhe extent that there is an tactual, a.s opposed to theoretical, problem). 
11
• Fedaral legislation has been proposed to prohibit employment 
di&erimination against parents, and former President Clinton issued an executive order 
on the iS1ue. See generally Smith, 1upro note 314, at 587 (diacussing the Ending 
Discrimination Against Parents Act., S. 1907, 106th Cong. (lst Se ... 1999) and 
Executive Order No. 13,152), 65 Fed. Reg. 26115 (May 4, 2000). 
u i See Elizabeth ~f, Adamitis, Appearance Jr,{atten: A Proposal to Prohibit 
Appea.ratice DiacriminaJion in Emp/.qy1nent, 15 \VASH. L. Rsv. 195 (2000): Jennifer 
Fowler-Hermes, The Beauty and the Bea.st i.n the \Vorkplace: Appearcmce-Based 
Diacrimi.notion CJ.a.inu Under EEO Lowa, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2001, at 32. The District of 
Columbia does prohibit employment discrimination based on .. per1Jonal appearance." 
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1402.ll(a). 
m &e Kim, supra note 20 (arguing that the anti-discrimination model is 
inappropriate for addressing genetic privacy i&sues); Smith, supra note 314 (arguing 
that anti-discrimination law is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing employment 
discrimination against parents). 
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The heavy artillery of employment anti-discrimination law 
should be used sparingly because it is also the biggest target 
for opponents of workplace regulation. It is not clear that it was 
or is needed to combat genetic discrimination in employment. 
Another cause for concern with genetic discrimination 
laws is their relationship with the ADA."' The class of 
protected persons under genetic discrimination laws resembles 
the class protected by the ADA; indeed, the EEOC maintains 
that genetic conditions are covered by the ADA. Th.e ADA has 
been a controversial law that has generated a surprisingly low 
number of plaintiffs' victories in the courts."' This occurrence 
has even been described as a "backlash" against the ADA.• The 
open definition of disability has led to many cases in which the 
plaintiff presented a laughable claim of an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity. Such cases have 
fueled media depictions of an employment law that permits 
absurd claims ... Even some scholars have been critical of the 
ADA.•• Regardless of how one regards the ADA, it has had a 
tumultuous run since its passage. To the extent genetic 
discrimination laws are perceived to be similar to the ADA, 
that perception does not presage a good future. 
Finally, and more significant, is the issue of 
redundancy. The EEOC takes the position that the ADA covers 
most of the cases that would be covered by a genetic 
discrimination law, and, in fact, it has filed suit in a case and 
settled it.- Redundancy in employment law is undesirable. It 
yields uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the state of 
•• s .. g•neroJly Kim, 1upra not.o 20, ot 1627-32. 
,,. Stt gtneraJly Ruth Colke.t, TJ1e American.e with DW:ibilit~• Act: A Windfall 
for 0.fend4nts, 34 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. Rl!V. 99 (1999); Linda Hamilton Kriesor, 
Foreword-Backlash Aaabrat the ADA: lnterdlacipllnory Perspective• and In1pl ic4tiol11 
for Social Justice Sirateaw•, 21 BERKELEY J . EMr. & LAB. L. 1, 7.s (2000). 
ru Sympoiium, Bockla1Jt Asai111r lht ADA: lt1terdi1ciplinory Per1pectlu11 a/id 
Implications for Social Ju•tice StratqiH, 21 BERKEU!Y J . EMP. & LAB. L. I (2000). 
• Krioger, •upra note 324, at 9-10; Cary LaCheen, A<hy Brealty PtM•, 
Lumber Lung ond Juggler'• lh1pair: Th• Portrtzyal of th~ Am~rican1 with Di.iobilitiu 
A<t on Ttlevuion and Radw, 21 BERKELEY J . EMP. & LAB. L. 223 !20001. Many or 
Gerald Skoning's ten "wackis~ t:mployme:nt caaa in his annual au.rvey in tM 
Notional I.mo Journal have been ADA CAMS. S.., •-6., Gerald D. Skoning, Wor•pl-
Wac•ineu Uou On. NA'l'L LJ., Mar. 26, 2002 at Al&. 
"" S.., e.g., Samuel UaacbarolT & Justin Nelaon, l>Ucrimi/llJ.lion With a 
Diff•renct: Con Employmcnl Di«riminaliM Low Accommodau IM Amui<lon.t With 
DUobililiu Ad?, 79 N.C. L. l!EV. 807 (2001). 
mi See supro not.es 95 .. 97 and accompanying text. 
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the law and excessive litigation."' Additionally, a new anti-
discrimination statute, if it were under the jurisdiction of the 
EEOC (and the EEOC has argued for it)'"' would spread more 
thinly the resources of the already overburdened agency.'" 
In sum, anti-discrimination employment law is a 
powerful tool that has done the heavy lifting of declariug and 
implementing important public policy. Rather than basing our 
anti-discrimination laws on preventing dignitary harms to 
insular groups, we have based them primarily on the equal 
opportunity principle. As influential and successful as the 
federal employment anti-discrimination Jaws have been, they 
are inviting targets for those who oppose regulation of the 
workplace. No parts of employment anti-disc."rimination law 
have been more controversial than harassment law and the 
ADA 'l'o protect our anti-discrimination laws, we should enact 
new ones with great reluctance and only after we have 
examined all options. 
D. Marginalization of Employment Law 
Employment Jaw in the United States is increasingly 
recognized as a distinct area of Jaw, so much so that it has 
become compartmentalized.'" This has some positive and 
negative ramifications. Broadly, it is good that legally 
regulating this important facet of life is viewed as worthwhile. 
On the negative side, employment law has been 
"marginaliz(ed) - lawyers and courts alike have acted as if 
employment law were something 'special,' existing outside the 
bounds of ordinary contract and tort law."'"' Moreover, 
employment at will has taken on a substantive life beyond the 
rebuttable presumption that it is."' It occupies so much of the 
domain of employment Jaw that courts do not apply standard 
a• See Summers, aupro noto 35, at 18-19 {predicting that reconc:iling 
overlapping protections would be the most difficult problem in employment law and 
slating that "lo)ne can scarcely llllagine an arrangement better deei,gned to hold out 
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, 
and clog the legal machinery"). 
Mn EEOC Heo.d Stresses Agtncy'tJ Need to Handle Genetic BiM Ccmplai.nt1, 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 14, 2002 (No. 31). nt A6. 
'" Smith, supra note 314, at 610·11. 
P2 See supra note 14 (discussing the emergence or employment law as a 
dist.inct area of the law). 
""Parker, supra note23,at352. 
"' Id. at 349-52. 
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contract and tort principles in the same way that they do in 
other contexts. Writing about wrongful discharge law, 
Professor J. Wilson Parker argued that lawyers, judges and 
scholars should stop viewing employment law as a ~boutique 
area of the lawn and apply common-law principles to wrongful 
discharges.• 
The marginalization concern also applies to the 
problems of electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination, and 
bullying. Employment law is margina lized, as Parker suggests, 
but I would modify the view that ho attributes to lawyers, 
judges, and scholars. The area of employment law is dominated 
by two great pillars: employment at will and statutory 
employment law (principally employment anti-discrimination 
law). Thus, absent statutory employment law, courts arc not 
likely to apply common law contract and tort theories and 
principles in a normal way."' An explanation for the atrophy of 
common law in employment is that courts may be paralyzed by 
fear that permitting recovery on a contract or tort theory by an 
employee will encroach too much on the employer prerogatives 
embodied in employment at will. 
An alternative explanation is that courts may take 
comfort in the insulation provided by the at-will doctrine; they 
do not have to second-guess employers' decisions because 
normal contract and tort principles are blunted by employment 
at will."' A good example of this is Qmibedeaux u. Dow 
Chemical Co .... In that case, one employee physically attacked 
another, and both were discharged pursuant to the company's 
no-fighting policy. The plaintiff sued the company under n 
vicarious liability theory for tho battery committed by the co-
employee and sought as elements of damages past and future 
lost wages and benefits resulting from the termination. Under 
the extended liability principle for intentional torts, as applied 
by the lower court, a plaintiff may recover for all dnmages 
~· ld. flt 354. 369 ("'The same lnw U1nt governs a too.sumer purcha1e or 
personal injury suit ahou1d also apply to one's livelihood.-). 
111
• P"rkcr anya .. It.Iha heart of trepidaUon rc81.1 with a reluctanc.-e to interfere 
with bueinee• judament-u.nquestionably • legltJmnle concern.• Id.. at 856. Trepidation 
aside, judicial ndmini.atJ>ation and docket management may better expla.in courte' 
reliance on employment at will; it is a convenient tool for dismiuing ca.see . 
., 5ft Nicholu v. AlllltaU. bu. Co., 739 So. 2d 830, &49-52 (La. Ct. App. 1999) 
<Caraway, J ., diOM!lting). rw'd, 765 So. 2d 1017 a... 2000). 
- 820 So. 2d 642 (La. 2002). 
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flowing from the tort, whether foreseeable or not."" The state 
supreme court reversed, however, stating that "victim 
compensation, which is one of the primary policies supporting 
vicarious liability, must give way to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, which furthers broader societal policies, such as 
maintaining a free and efficient flow of human resources."'" 
Examples of courts' treatments of the torts of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of 
privacy also demonstrate the skewing of common law principles 
by employment at will. Courts generally will not find 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case in which 
the plaintiff was terminated because to do so would provide a 
theory to circumvent employment at will.' " Invasion of privacy 
cases also show that employers' interests overwhelm 
employees' interests, as courts conclude that employees do not 
have reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace, and 
even if they do, the invasions are not highly offensive because 
of employers' interests in workplace management.'" Thus, the 
marginalizat1on of employment law means that the general 
common law of torts and contracts provides little recourse to 
employees. Instead, their recourse is largely in federal and 
state statutory Jaw. In turn, the preeminence of statutes slowly 
eviscerates the common law of employment. 
But why is this bad, given the preference of many in the 
legal profession, including scholars, for legislation? First, the 
day is coming, if it has not already come, when meaningful 
employment statutes will be difficult, and perhaps impossible, 
to pass. As discussed above, in the wrongful termination 
context, statutes cannot be enacted until employers become 
frustrated with and afraid of the common law.'" Then, when 
the statutes are enacted, they often take away the advantages 
that employees had under the common law. As previously 
discussed, the past decade has not seen one major federal 
"'' Quebedeaux v, Dow Chem. Co., 809 So. 2d 983, 989 (La. Ct. App. 2001), 
rev'd, 820 So. 2d 54 2 !Lo. 2002). 
- Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d at 546. Throo justices concurred and stated 
different r•tionaJes for reversing, and one expressly stated that he djd not think the 
&tatement about employment ·st Y.'ill was: correct. Id. at 547 (Calogero, C.J., 
concurring). 
s.i See supra notes 200·02 and accompanying text. See also Austin, supra note 
200, at 8-12; Gergen, 1upra note 28, at 1702-03. 
•n See supra notes 114·32 and 8ccompanying text. See also Wilborn, supra 
note 19, at 844-46; Kesan, supra note 19, at 302-04; Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1019-25. 
"
1 See supra note 264 and aCC"Ompanying text. 
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employment law, despite the significance of emerging issues. 
Even the vapid electronic monitoring notification bills have not 
been enacted at the federal level or by California .... Thus, one 
result of marginalization is that even when legislatures do pass 
statutes, employees get minimum rights statutes that give 
them very little. Moreover, it has grown increasingly difficult to 
enact even those laws. 
Second, cordoning off employment law in a realm of 
federal and state legislation permits courts to reject common 
law theories with aplomb. Consider, for example, the impact 
that passage of an electronic monitoring notification statute, 
which would do very little to protect the privacy rights and 
dignity of employees, likely would have on the tort of invasion 
of privacy. If an employer gave the notification required by the 
statute, courts would find no invasion of privacy regardless of 
how egregious it was. 
Common law tort and contract theories are the stuff of 
everyday life. With the recognition that work has become 
perhaps the predominant aspect of life in the United States, it 
is ironic that we have permitted tho law governing that aspect 
to become so marginalized and entrusted to a single method of 
regulation.'" However, some scholars have decried a significant 
role for common law in regulating the workplace."• Although 
the com.moo law cannot and should not be the primary means 
of employment regulation,"' it has historically been a piece of 
the approach, and it is still needed."' We have become so 
enamored of legislation that we seem to have forgotten that 
there are some matters better left to common law. There are 
several strong reasons, recounted above, why one should be 
cautious about new legislation. The employment law of tho 
future will be less responsive to both employer and employee 
141 See supra note. 160·62 nod occ:ompllnylng text. 
,., Cf. Be.rn&tein, eupra note 39, at 1664. ( .. As between a new tort and a 
vigorous display or group-baaed actlvitm, I admit a bit or a bias in favor or the DOW 
tort."). 
... See, e..1., Duffy, 1upro note 201, at 892 ("'Civil tort litigation ia not a.n ideal 
inatrument to brini about radica.1 chan1e In the bnlan~ of power in the workplace an.d 
moy well delay the search for effective methods of enforcing workers' richt1. ") • 
..., D.au-&hmidt, tupro oot.e 23, 1t 700 ("'Oiven it.a limitation1 . .. it eeema 
unlikely r.hAt adaptali<>n o{ the a>mmoo law will ever become the primary ll1Ml1I of 
ocldn!osing employee dema.odll in lhia country."). 
- S<e Samuel Juacbaroll', Conlra<till6 for Emp/.oytnUll: T~ LimiUd Ruurn 
of th• Common Lau>, in GLOBAL COlolPETITIOH, eupro note 261. at 499, 534 (deacribing 
the common law's role as a fallback apin1t voids .... uJtinc &om decline in coUectivo 
ba:ra:aininc and the partial coverage oft.he anti-diec::rimination laws). 
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needs if it abandons the common Jaw approach and accedes to a 
rigid statutory framework. 
V . R EINVIGORATING THE COMMON LAW OF THE W ORKPLACE 
In the 1970s and 1980s courts and scholars actively 
worked with the common law to address the issue of wrongful 
discharge. Courts recognized the employment tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public pol.icy, the tort or contract 
theory (deponcling on tho state) of breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and various other common law 
theories of recovery.' " In those regards, the California and 
Michigan courts were particularly active and creative, and the 
Montana courts drove employers to support wrongful discharge 
legislation.• It is time to reinvigorate the common law in the 
context of employment to address workplace privacy and 
harassment issues. New tort theories do not appear to be 
needed,•• but intentional infliction of emotional distress (IlEO) 
and invasion of privacy must be re-evaluated and redefined 
wi thin the workplace context. "' 
A. Retrofitting llltentional Infl,iction of Emotional Distress: 
Substantive 
To adjust IIED to address general harassment in the 
workplace, courts must lower the bar of "outrageous~ conduct 
in the employment setting. Courts have recognized the te.nsion 
between the wide berth given to management prerogative 
:m• Ste s11pro noLea 287·39 and accompanying text. 
IMl St!t 111pro notee 253·66 and accompanying t.cxt. 
ui It i& temptin1 to TeCOmmend a new tort, which I gueu I would ceU 
workplace abuse, u Pror•-r Blad .. did in 1967 with •bu.Ive diocbarge. See •upra 
note 238. I reoiol that tempuodoo for oeveral l'OQOn1. Pirot., when Prorouor Bladeo 
propooe.d lhe new IDn. l.Mre wu no tort theory thu addretMCI wrongful dilocharge. 
5-od, Prof0$0Qr Bernoi.in hu dJocuosed tbe difficuftieo 0(1u ..... fW(y ettating a MW 
IA>rL B•rnslein, aupro note 39. Why race the aubotantial likelihood lhot o oew IA>rt will 
rau when there are existing tort& that can be modified to do the job? Thitd, to create a 
new e.mployment...speeiRc tort further compartment.aUzes employment law. and as l 
have explained above, 1 think t.hot result is undesirable. 
162 Going against. the grain of favoring new flmploymcnt legislation, several 
achola.1"$ have recommended common law approaches to workplace is11uce. Kesan, '"Pro 
note 19, at 322-32 (proposing a contract solution to electronic privacy is.sues); 
Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at. .t4-63 (proposing that. an a<ijust.ed intentional infliction 
theory supplement sexual hanwmeot law); Makdisi, •upro note 20, at 1019-25 
(1uggMting that an ~Wiled IA>rt theory of invasion or privacy e&n effectively oddreoa 
ll"'DeDc intzusions). 
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under employment at will and the competing idea that 
workplace environments are a setting in which severe 
emotional distress is particularly likely to occur. There are 
several facets of the employment setting that make it a 
breeding ground for severe emotional distress: a hierarchical 
organization with authority vested in supervisors; the ever-
present threat of discipline or termination and consequent peril 
of loss of livelihood; a captive audience, in that victims of 
harassment may not leave work simply because they are 
distraught; and almost constant contact with and exposure to 
the same people."' Because employment in this nation is so 
closely identifled with one's value and identity in society,"' and 
because so many needs, such as health insurance and 
retirement plans, are tied to employment, employees place the 
well-being of themselves iµid their families at risk when they 
go to work. 
Courts have struck tho balance lopsidedly, resolving the 
vast majority of the cases in favor of management prerogative 
rather than the workplace distress factors. In large pnrt, then, 
it is the threat to employment at will posed by IIED that bas 
caused courts to keep the bar so high. It is one thing, however, 
for courts to say that not every termination gives rise to an 
IlED claim, and another to say that no case in which 
harassment ends in termination or constructive discharge can 
give rise to an IIED claim. Because employees have so much at 
risk in their jobs and are subject to so many pressures, 
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich recommends that the workplace be 
considered "an inherently aggravating factor" in IIED claims."' 
Her suggestion, thus, is for courts to restrike the balance on 
IIED in the workplace, giving greater weight to the 
characteristics of the workplace that make it more stressful 
than other settings, and less weight to the need of employers to 
manage the workplace through some level of mental distress. 
While the employment-at-will conce.ms that courts have 
about IIED in the workplace will render most courts reluctant 
to articulate an "inherently aggravating factor" standard, 
Ehrenreich has indicated the direction in which courts should 
move and provided the supporting rationale. Indeed, a 
straightforward application of tort law principles to 
• Stt$ e.s., ~nttich, au pro note 23, at 45~62. 
_. Id. at 49. Set altJO •upra nole 37. 
• • Ehrenreich, 1upra note 23, at 49. 
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employment would suggest that courts should lower the 
threshold of outrageous conduct in the workplace. Early cases 
applied lower standards for outrageous conduct, permitting 
recovery for insults in cases involving customers interacting 
with public utilities and common carriers,"' and this was later 
expanded to innkeepers. 
Many of the same reasons for recognizing a special 
relationship between the foregoing entities and their customers 
also apply to employers and employees."' Thus, regardless of 
whether courts are willing to expressly state that employment 
is an "inherently aggravating factor," consistent with 
established tort principles, courts can lower tho standards for 
the elements of IIED in the workplace. Moreover, although this 
Article does not advocate for a general harassment statute, 
courts could fashion a more useful and appropriate standard 
for outrageous workplace conduct by using protected-<:11188 
harassment cases to inform the types of conduct that might be 
considered outrageous. Thus, courts could look for guidance to 
cases of conduct found to be severe or pervasive enough to 
constitute sexual, racial, religious, national origin, ago, or 
disability harassment. 
B. Retrofitting Invasion of Privacy: Substantive 
Invasion of privacy (principally intrusion on seclusion) 
is a flexible theory that can address electronic monitoring and 
genetic invasions.* Regarding genetic discri.mination, tort 
theory could augment the coverage already provided by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and state genetic 
discrimination laws. For electronic monitoring, invasion of 
privacy should be aqjusted to play a central role in light of the 
failure of the notice bills to be enacted, and their inadequacy to 
provide meaningful protection even if enacted. 
The most pressing need is for courts to recognize that 
employees can have privacy expectations in the workplace by 
prohibiting employers from destroying privacy expectations 
"' R&s'TAT£MENT (SECOND), supra note 115, f 48; DOBOS, 1upra note 117, f 
303. 
"' See, •.1 .. Bodewig v, K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, M-0-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), 
rev. <kn~ 644 P.2d 1128 (Qr. 1982) (permitting reoovery for reckl••• iAJliction of 
emotional di.8-trea becaUM employer-employee i• a "'apeclal relatiooahip• involvinc an 
imbalance of power). 
• S.. Makdioi, •upra note 20, at 1004. 
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through policies and statements. Until that change occurs, 
unrealistic contract notions that the employer and employee 
have agreed upon little or no expectation of privacy will 
continue to undermine the tort theory.• In employment, 
negotiation and agreement on privacy rarely occurs, and tort 
law should recognize a duty of employers to respect employeea' 
reasonable expectations of privacy and not permit employers to 
disclaim it. Although it may take some work by courts and 
perhaps trumping of contract law by tort law, there are general 
tort principles that courts could apply to halt employer 
eviscerations of employee privacy expectations. For example, 
duress or coercion may render consent ineffective."' An 
alternative or additional ground for rendering consent an 
ineffective defense could be that the invasion exceeded the 
scope of the consent.•• 
If a court chooses to emphasize the contract aspects of 
the privacy tort, there are other contract rationales under 
which courts could hold unenforceable employees' agreements 
to waive privacy rights. For example, a waiver may be 
unenforceable na violating public policy when there is a 
significant disparity of bargaining power between the parties."' 
Another tenet requires that waivers be knowing and 
voluntary.• On the other side of the Catch-22 of intrusion upon 
seclusion, if an employee refuses to permit the intrusion, courts 
can find that attempts to intrude satisfy the intrusion 
requirement based upon the power imbalance and the effect on 
the employee of the attempted intrusion ... 
C. Retrofitting Both Intentional Infl,iction of Emotional 
Distress and Invasion of Privacy: Procedural 
There are two important procedural changes that 
should be made to the applicable torts. First, for both IlED and 
invasion of privacy, the most necessary a<ijustment is for courts 
• Spencer, aupro note 56, at 8?0 . 
... RKSTATEMENT (SECON'D). •upra note 115, f 8928(3). 
*" Id"· 11et also RESTAT8f.lENT(SEOOND), 1upra note 116, § 892A(4). 
"' &., t ./I., Doe v. Smithkline Boochn1n Corp., 855 S.W.2d 24S, 263 (Tex. CL 
App. 1993), affd a• modi(uul, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995) 
• Eetlund, •upro note 270, et 23-27. 
- &., ..... Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serva., Inc., 485 So.2d 706, 709 
Wa. 1983) O>oldinc that a<quisition o( infonruitlon rrom • plaintiH is not. requitite 
element orintn11ion upon IOlitudei 
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to refrain from granting so many summary judgments"' and to 
let close cases proceed to trial. Juries have sufficient sympathy 
for employees who aro harassed and subjected to invasions of 
privacy.• Consider, for example, the Kentucky case, Stringer u. 
Wal·Mart Stores, Inc.,"' in which four Wal-Mart clerks were 
discharged for eating candy and nuts from damaged packages. 
Wal-Mart claimed the employees had violated a store pilferage 
policy, but the employees claimed they were following an 
unwritten store policy whereby such food was left in the 
employee lounges for consumption. The plaintiffs sued for 
IlED, invasion of privacy and slander."" A jury awarded each 
plaintiff five million dollars in compensatory and punitive 
damages.• 
The call for fewer summary judgments in this context is 
not merely an ends-oriented approach. It is by no means clear 
that the two elements on which IlED and invasion of privacy 
claims are routinely dismissed on summary judgment -
outrageous conduct and expectation of privacy, respectively -
should be decided by courts as a matter of law. Because both 
outrageous conduct and reasonable expectation of privacy 
invoke societal standards, these questions, like breach in 
negligence cases, aro appropriate for jury resolution, and only 
rarely should be decided by courts. 
Additionally, diverting more employment cases t.o 
alternative dispute resolution methods could be a partial 
panacea for the courts' tendency to dismiss employment tort 
cases on summary judgment. It is possible that arbitrators and 
* See, e41 .• Gera:on. 11•pra note 28, at 1726-33. Prore.ssor Boincr makes thi1 
argument regarding sexual haro11n1ent case.a. Set Thereaa M. Bclncr, Ltt tM Jury 
Decide: TM G4p lktwtt11 Whot Judget and Rea,.nabl• P•ople Believe la Sexually 
Horo"i"ll, 75 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 791, 791-95 (2002). 
• Stt Ge:l'ge.I\. •upro note 28. at 1736 (not.ins that juries are correctly 
perceived to be biased -it11l •mployon in tort..-~ Schmidt v. Amoritecb Ill., 768 
N.E. 2d 303 ffil. App. Cl. 2002)(overtuming awanl of$3 million in punitive~ to 
employee in invuion of privacy claim where employer esamined home telephone 
""'°""or employH). Cf. Seiner, IWpro note 365, 842-46. 
"" No. 95-Cl-00228 (K.y. Cir. Cl., judgment entered Jan. 19, 1999), reported 
in, Wal-Mart Ordt,.d to Ptzy $20 Million to Four Store Clerkt Firrd for Eati111 Cond,y, t• Individual Employment Rlght1 (BNA), Jan. 26, 1999 (No. 14), at 1. 
"' See al"° Roth v. Forner-Boeken Co., No. 98-815 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Jan. 2, 2002), 
reported in Soulh Dalwto Jury Award• $525,000 to Mn11 \Vito Cluim1 EmpW>~r Opened p,,..,,,,,o} Moil, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 5, 2002 (No. 24), at A6. 
,. &:-Wal-Mart Stoff Aroorrhd $20 Milli<>tt in K<ntucky 1Aw1uit, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 18, 1999, at AIO; WaJ.Afon Ortkred to Poy $20 MU/ion to Four Store Clerlt.r Fired 
for Eating Condy, 14 Individual Employment Righia (BNAl, Jan. 26, 1999 (No. 14~ at 
L 
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mediators may be more receptive than judges to claims of 
workplace abuse .... 
D. Hope for Common Law Change and the Obstacle of 
Rigid Courts 
Is there any hope that courts will make any of the above 
substantive and procedural changes in their approaches to the 
tort theories?"' Many object that. the courts are too rigid to 
adjust the common law torts to address these problems."' 
Soveral responses are in order. First, the difficulty of effecting 
change is no excuse to stop advocating for change."' All that is 
needed is time and pressure."' The evolution of the common 
law is oft.en slow, but it docs evolve to address new challenges 
and reflect society's evolving values.m General recognition in 
tort of recovery for emot.ional distress injuries has taken place 
largely within the last. forty years, and mostly within the past. 
t.hirty .... Because of the limitat.ions of legislation and the value 
of a common law approach t.o those problems, it is no answer t.o 
dismiss the common law because of the difficulty and paco. As 
with many things in life, t.ho fast.est and seemingly easiest 
approach is not necessarily the best. 
"" Stt, <.(/., Po1U/ Ord1t'I Do<u Ch1ml«1/ to R•ln•au a Dozen w.,...,., Piml 
for B·Moll Abua, •upro nole 66 Carbitratlon panel ordered reinstatement of L2 
emplo,.... becaUM or di1paraU1 Lrealm•nl und•• &mall policy); Olt!Moma future Co. 
and Cal'Jlftnurs, 1-al 9<13, 01-02 Lab. Arl>. Awards (CCH), t 3912 (July 7, 2001) 
(arbitnt.or awarded rei.nat.Atem@nt to employee fh~ for insubordination becau.u 
employoo wu provokod by 1upervi10r'I bullylna) (citing Yamada, •upru """' 18). An 
•rbitn.t.or •warded a termlnaU!d employee $200,000 ror intentional iniliction o( 
emolJonal distress, butt.he di•Lric:C. ooun vacated lllo award in Hughe. Tra.lning, Inc:. v, 
Cook, ™ F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001). Tho srbltr•tlon •111"..,ment oolabliahod a broader 
standard or rov·iew- the judiciel atandard or review-than normally applies to arbitrs.1 
nwArds. 
ru See \Vilborn, supra note 19, nt 864 (a oom1non law appnnu;h to privacy 
tissues would require "c:onaideroblc judlc:lnl ac:tlviam.'' And courts do not. appeflr willing 
t.o engage in such); Kcs.an, t1upra note 19, ot 322 (suggesting that courts may 11.ap in t.o 
limit employer monitoring, but it i1 unJikcly bated on pa.st record). 
m Stt, e.g .• Ehrenreich, 1upro not.o 23, at 55-66 (addressing the rigid court.t 
olliection). 
:an Id. 
"' Stt THE SHAWSllANK RllOE.MPnOll (Columbia Pictures 1994) . 
.,. Bhronreich, 1upro note 23. at 66-66; Cf. 8el'lllU!in, •upro nc>Ce 39, at 1565 
c-the measured, respect(uJ IDOYemenl O( a new tort will always appur (eebfe l.O 
activiall •... "). 
- &e g<Mrolly Nancy Levlt, Bth<l'Mi Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. Rf;v. 136 
(1992). Cf. Martha Chamallaa, The Archlted•re cf Bioa: Dttp Slruduru in Tor< Law, 
146 U. PA. L. REY. 463 (1998). 
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A second reason to have hope for the common law 
changes discussed above is the influence of existing statutory 
law on the tort theories. Both IIED and invasion of privacy 
became more successful tort theories after the emergence of 
Title VII harassment law. 'l'he infl uence of harassment law 
under Title VII has made llED a more successful theory in the 
employment context.m The ADA, with its limitations on pre-
employment medical testing and other limitations on the 
dissemination and use of information about disabilities, should 
bolster the invasion of privacy tort in the context of genetic 
discrimination. Although there is not as much federal law 
relevant to electronic monitoring, a recent case under the 
Federal Wiretap Act indicates that the case Jaw under federal 
statutes could strengthen the privacy tort with respect to 
electronic monitoring. Specifically, in Smith u. Deuers,"" a 
federal district court reversed the granting of summary 
judgment on claims under the Federal Wiretap Act and the tort 
of invasion of privacy where an employer taped private 
telephone conversations of an employee. 
A third reason to hope and beHevc that courts will make 
acijustmcnts in the torts is the change in IIED in Texas in 
recent years. Texas is one of the strongest at-will states in the 
nation,'" but its courts have permitted the development of IIED 
in the workplace. 'l'he Texas Supreme Court recognized IIED in 
a workplace resulting in resignations in GTE Southwest, Inc. u. 
Bruce. - Practitioners predicted that the case would make it 
more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgments on 
IIED claims.'" A survey of Texas cases appears to support this 
prediction, although employers still win quite a few.~ In one of 
the most conspicuous of the post-GTE Southwest IIED cases in 
'" Stt 1upro notot 27·28 and accompanying t.oxt.. 
"' 2002 WL 76803 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002). 
"' Cf. Sabine Pilol Serv., Inc. v. Haucli, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Ta 19851 
(recognizing narrow public poUcy exception lO employmenl It will); Mont11>mery 
County Hoap. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998) Cdiocu .. ing lhe epeciftclly or 
11t.a~ent. required for Tex.as court.I t.o find an employment contract of definite 
duntionl. 
- 998 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1999). For di5cuaioo of' the cue Ind C0<1$icleralion of 
both prior Texas caMI law lnvolving OED in the workplace and the nmificationt or the 
GTE Southwtat case on fuLure workplace claims, see Dudley 0 . Jordan, &pand;.ng tM 
Pot.ential for Recouery of Afental Ang11J1h Damage• 111 t~ Employ1nerit Setting: A Case 
Nou on GTE Southweot. lnc. v. Bruce. 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 461 (2000). 
"' Earl M. Jon ... m. et al, Employment and Labor Law, 54 SMU L. R£v. 
1307. 1332 (2001). 
"' Id. at 1332-36. 
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the Texas courts, an appellate court affirmed an award of 
approximately ten million dollars, including eight million 
dollars in exemplary damages, to a former employee who sued 
for sexual harassment end IIED."' 
Even more recently, a Connecticut case indicates that 
some courts ere becoming more receptive to IIED claims in the 
workpiece setting. In Benton u. Simpson, .. five plaintiffs sued 
their manager for IIED based on his temper tantrums, 
profanity-laced tirades, and physical acts such as pounding on 
file cabinets. The plaintiffs testified that the defendant made 
statements such es, "You women make me sick, you're like a 
cancer."* 
Tho plaintiffs requested a prejudgment remedy to 
secure a monetary award in the case. The trial court conducted 
a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to 
believe that tho plaintiffs would prevail. Remarkably, the trial 
court determined that there was probable cause and ordered an 
etta.chment on the equity in the defendant's house in the 
amount of one hundred thousand dollars. Aliirming, the 
appellate court commented on the outrage element of the tort: 
"(B)ecause the plaintiffs and defendant worked in close 
proximity to one another end because of tho nature of the 
employment relationship, it was difficult for the plaintiffs to 
avoid continued interaction with the defendant."·"" 
Thus, common law tort theories can be modified to 
effectively address electronic monitoring, genetic 
discrimination, and general harassment. Critics of a common 
law approach are understandably skeptical that courts will 
make the needed adjustments. However, es described above, 
there is reason to believe that the torts will evolve to reflect 
society's values in addressing these problems. Although the 
pace of common law change is slower, the benefits should be 
worth the wait. 
- Rolfman·La Rocho, lnc. v. Zeltwanger, 69 S.W.3d 634 (Tox. App. 2002). 
The Hoffmon·Lo RocM oue involved sexual h.uuament, howevu, and tho wlllingneu 
or courta to pennh. recovery don not always tnlnslate to 1t..lu1-neutral harusment. 
For exo.mpJe, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that aexual hara11me.nt might 
be considered outrageous in B111tClmeto v. Tuc/w,r, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992), but it 
re:versed a judgment fol' & man who was tho victim of a pattern of haranment in 
Nidtcloa v. All·Stat. Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000). 
"' 829 A.2d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
"' Id. at 71. 
3
• Id. at. 74. 
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E. The Relationship Between Workers' Compem1ation Law 
and a Tort Approach 
Somo point to state workers' compensation laws as a 
potential problem for tort law solutions in the employment 
context. The concern is that exclusivity provisions in many 
states' laws render employers immune from tort lawsuits ... 
However, this should not be a significant impediment to a tort-
based approach. Either tort law or workers' compensation law 
is available to provide a remedy, and under some workers' 
compensation laws, both will be available. Most notably, under 
many state compensation Jaws, the exclusivity provision does 
not apply to intentional torts, .. allowing a plaintiff suing for 
IIED ... or invasion of privacyM to recover in tort. 
lf a plaintiff is in a jurisdiction that does not have an 
exception for intentional torts or the plaintiff is unable to prove 
an intentional tort, the plaintifi's tort clajm may still survive. 
Many states have heightened requirements for workers' 
compensation coverage of mental iajuries caused by mental 
stress.'" While thjs seemingly inures to the benefit of the 
employer, it can have an ironic effect. If tho injured employee 
cannot satisfy the heightened requirements for workers' 
compensation coverage, then the exclusivity provision may not 
apply (i.e., no coverage, no exclusivity), and the employee may 
be able to sue for negligence.• 
A second role for workers' compensation law would be as 
a factor for courts to use in evaluating conduct to determine 
whether it is sufficiently outrageous under an llED claim or 
highly offensive under an invasion of privacy claim. If courts 
find that no workers' compensation remedy is available, that 
should be a basis for lowering the bar for tort recovery. This is 
justified in view of the history of workers' compensation laws in 
relation t.o tort law. Workers' compensation laws were adopted 
to provide a remedy for workplace injuries when tort defenses 
' " Stt, •·B·· Ehrenteich, aupro note 23, at 56-57 (diacuaaing this problem with 
a torts approach to workplaoo injuries). 
,., 1 MODERN WORKERS COMP&NSA'MON f 102.13 (Clark &anlrnan Callaghan 
1993). 
a• PERRITI', 1upro not.e ll5, at§ 8.13. 
•• S..., •·I·• Karch v. BayBanlt FSB, 794 A.2d 763 (N.H. 2002). 
•• l MODERN WORKERSCoMP&NSATION, 1upro note 388, f 109.29. 
• Richanl80n v. Home Depot U.$.A., 808 So. 2d 5« <La. Ct. App. 2001~ 
Grimm v. US WHt Communications, In<., 64-4 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2002). 
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barred recovery. The interaction between tort law and workers' 
compensation always bas been to provide a remedy for workers 
injured in the workplace. 
The role of the workers' compensation laws when they 
were first enacted in the early 1900s was to provide benefits in 
cases in which tort recoveries were virtually impossible ... 
Then, lawmakers were concerned with rampant physical 
injuries resulting during the rise of industrialism. Now, as 
mental distress becomes a growing concern because of bullying, 
electronic monitoring, and genetic testing, a balance can be 
struck between the workers' compensation law and tort law to 
provide coverage for injuries.'" Accordingly, one can see 
workers' compensation laws not as a problem or obstacle in tort 
responses to employment law issues, but as part of a solution 
that acljusta existing and malleable tort theories to address 
emerging workplace issues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are a number of problems with legislatlvo 
solutions to emerging workplace problems, particularly 
invasion of privacy, genetic discrimination, and bullying. The 
epoch of reliance on statutory responses to employment 
problems bas had two unfortunate consequences. First, the 
common law, which has been such an important part of the law 
regulating people's daily lives, has lost ground in one of the 
major relationships of modern life: work. Second, and relatedly, 
when there is no employment statute to act as a check, the 
dominance of employment at will and the related notions of 
employer power and prerogative skew common law doctrine 
and analysis. 
Modem common law solutions can correct these 
distortions. True, common Jaw will not eliminate harmful 
conduct in the workplace as fast as federal statutes, but federal 
statutes creating meaningful and worthwhile protections of 
employees' dignity are not going to be enacted. Moreover, it is 
tlllJ Sta, ,,,., AR1'1fUR LARsoN, LAnSON19 WORKMEN'S CO,.IPENSATION: DESK 
EDITION If 4 .80 & 6.20 (1982). 
* For example, a Louisiana 1tote court, noting that there was oo worken' 
compensation coverage for an employee'• men~I distress iqjuriee, permitted I.he 
negligent infliction cloim to go forward, noting that an employtr'1 dut;y to provide a 
safe work place includes a duty to avoid caU1iD1 e '"mental breakdown.* Rklaord«Jl1. 
808 So. 2d at 650 CIA. Ct. App. 2001). 
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not clear that they should be. There are problems of fit, timing, 
and overuse oflogislation. One of the positive characteristics of 
the common law is that it can and does adjust to reflect 
society's values."' That tort law would not impose liability in as 
many cases as some employee rights advocates wish is not 
necessarily bad.• The Supreme Court has been adamant th.at 
not even Title VII is a general civility code that will address 
every unpleasantry . ., 
Writing about 11ED in the context of wrongful 
discharges, Professor Mark Gergen recognized its rare 
successes and defended its use for egregious cases."' Gergen 
remarked on an important aspect of the role for the common 
law in employment cases. In areas in which the conduct is 
difficult to define and there are important competing interests 
such that tho society is not willing to pass meaningful 
legislation, tort law and contract law should fill the breach. The 
common law patrols the ambiguous border of acceptability, 
catching the cases that clearly cross over. What is needed now 
to improve American workplaces is for the common law to catch 
more cases of harassment, electronic monHoring, and genetic 
discriminat.ion. That can and should be done without new 
legislation. 
Federal legislation was needed to deal with 
discriminators in the last century. It is not yet clear that 
controlling electronic and genetic privacy invaders and bullies 
requires more legislation. With common law filling some gaps, 
over time society will discover whether legislation is needed 
and appropriate. Until then, however, what we need is a 
revitalized common law of the workplace . 
., Stt, '-6·· M•nhall S. Sbopo, /n lh< looAiJ18 014U: Whot Torta &hdonloip 
Can Tra<h U• About lh< Am•ri<On Experit.n«, S9 NW. U. L. REY. 1567, 1569 (1995) 
(-c'ort jurisprudence ,, • rel11tively accurate renect0r or American society'• baaic 
principJes for microgovemance.•) . 
.. See Ehrenrelc:h, 1upra note 23, at 31 n.127 (observing that Profesaor 
Austin "casts her net too broadly" in trying to pull within tho ombit of UED workplace 
oonduc.t that. is merely unpleaaant.); Kim, aupra note 17, at. 691 (arguing th.at not every 
violation ofpriva.cy should have a legal remed;y bec1tuse "'ll)omo intrusions are ao trivial 
that they will be expttie.nced by mo.t people as me.re annoyance• or rudeness.•). 
"' Oncale v. Sundownor Offabore Serva., Inc .. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
• ~. •upro n.C. 28, at 1737-39. 
